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ABSTRACT 
Since the 9/11 attacks by Al Qaeda members against the United States, 
counterterrorism has become a top priority for policymakers and academic 
researchers. A critical aspect of this mandate is the prevention and intervention 
of future terrorist attacks by U.S.-based jihadist and Salafist extremists. This 
study aims to generate a typology of homegrown terrorists who have been 
prosecuted by the United States federal government for terrorism offenses within 
the United States since the 9/11 attacks. The current study uses a sample of 115 
cases, involving 194 offenders. 
Three clusters of offenders who share a set of demographic, social, and 
behavioral characteristics were identified through a two-step cluster analysis. 
These clusters include: Cyber Attackers, Convert Affiliates, and Trained Allies. 
Clusters also exhibited variation in the nature of terrorist activity and degree of 
operational success. The unique characteristics of each cluster suggest possible 
policy implications for international travel, cyber regulation, and community 
outreach programs to address the unique threats posed by subgroups of 
offenders. Efforts to prevent future terrorist plots and attacks may be more 
effective if the type of offender is considered.
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1CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Background 
The September 11, 2001 Al Qaeda attacks resulting in nearly 3,000 
deaths and billions of dollars in financial losses was the worst terrorist attack in 
American history. Since then, the United States government has made 
counterterrorism a top priority. While the threat from foreign-based operatives 
continues, a growing concern among scholars and practitioners alike has been 
the analysis and interdiction of homegrown terrorism involving citizens and 
residents of the United States. While homegrown extremist movements range 
across a wide variety of ideologies, which include racist, anti-government, and 
animal liberation movements, this study examines jihadist and Salafist extremists 
who reside in the United States. This research focus springs from a documented 
change in terrorist operational and recruitment strategy. In addition to 
orchestrated attacks by operatives, Al Qaeda and related movements now have 
a bifurcated strategy of inspiring radical Islamic American citizens and residents 
outside of their command structure to undertake terrorist attacks within the 
United States. These individuals and cells, such as the April 2013 Boston 
Marathon assailants, are the focus of this analysis. 
Key components of the counterterrorism effort by law enforcement include 
not only undercover informants and intelligence gathering, but offender analysis 
2as well. Identifying the common characteristics of individuals who were 
radicalized into violent Islamist ideology will aid efforts to not only detect plots, 
but will ultimately prevent attacks against the United States. Understanding more 
about the type of individuals who become homegrown terrorists will generate 
policy implications that extend beyond the immediate strategic concerns 
associated with investigating terrorist threats to prevention strategies that can be 
deployed by customs and immigration services, integrated into community 
outreach and partnership efforts, and incorporated into web-based surveillance.  
 
Statement of the Problem 
Homegrown plots and attacks by Islamic radicals represent the most 
frequent terrorist incidents in the post September 11 period and pose a unique 
threat to law enforcement (U.S. House, Committee on Homeland Security, 2012). 
While Al Qaeda and its affiliates still seek to directly attack American targets, 
they have broadened their strategy to include not only their own foreign-based 
members to launch operations, but non-member sympathizers already present in 
the United States. Individuals are now being radicalized by Islamic ideology 
through interaction with: experienced extremists, the Internet, social media 
websites, recruiters stationed in the United States, and interaction with 
radicalized inmates in prison (U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security 
and Governmental Affairs, 2012).  
3The presence of homegrown terrorists already residing in the United 
States presents an acute vulnerability to the American homeland. Estimates of 
the number of homegrown Islamic plots occurring within the United States since 
9/11 range from 63 to 188. These estimates vary widely due to case inclusion 
criteria and differences in how terrorism is defined (Bergen, Lebovich, Petruso, 
Rowland, & Greenwald, 2012; Bjelopera, 2013; Jenkins, 2010; Southern Poverty 
Law Center, 2011). Given the critical threat posed by U.S.-based attacks, it is 
critical to generate a well-constructed definition to identify relevant cases so as to 
better understand the nature of this problem.  
In the current study, three criteria were used to identify cases. First, 
offenses were classified as incidents of homegrown terrorism based on the 
citizenship status of the main perpetrators. Homegrown terrorists are individuals 
who act against their home nation, both through domestic and foreign criminal 
terrorist behavior. This includes any prosecuted case involving:  
the unlawful use, or threatened use, of force or violence by a group or 
individual, based and operating entirely within the United States or Puerto 
Rico, committed against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a 
government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof in furtherance 
of political, social, religious, or ideological objectives. (Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, n.d.; White, 2006) 
By narrowing case selection to those incidents that occurred within the United 
States (second criteria) and not at locations of U.S. jurisdiction abroad (e.g., a 
4military base), the results will lend themselves more directly to developing local 
interdiction policies. Finally, it is important to consider a wider range of activity 
that was studied previously. When studies include a broad range of terrorist 
behavior—e.g., attacks, attempted attacks, plots, and material support to terrorist 
organizations--more information is available to support developing a policy-
oriented typology.  
 
Purpose of the Study 
This study examines homegrown Islamic extremists who were prosecuted 
since September 11, 2001 with the intent of developing an offender typology that 
differentiates subgroups of offenders based on a unique set of personal, social, 
and criminal behavioral characteristics. While extensive terrorism literature 
exists, little work has been done in the area of developing a typology of 
homegrown terrorists. Moreover, while the extant literature depicts how terrorist 
plots are intercepted, no one has of yet used incident details to help generate a 
profile of homegrown terrorists. It is argued that a clearer understanding of the 
different groups of individuals involved in homegrown terrorism can be derived 
from using information drawn from all homegrown terrorist cases, including both 
plots and attacks. Being more inclusive in selecting cases to use when 
developing an offender typology stands to generate a more comprehensive 
typology than what is currently available. In turn, the resulting classification 
5system may offer a clearer direction for developing post-event investigation 
techniques and strategies to prevent future incidents on the American homeland.  
 
Importance of the Study 
Homegrown Islamic radicals, who have plotted and successfully attacked 
the United States, as well as those individuals who provide material support to 
terrorism, pose a significant threat to the United States. Radicalization of U.S.-
based individuals widens resources available to terrorist organizations, even 
when there is no intent to foment specific violent jihadist plots (Bjelopera, 2013, 
p. 29). For example, Cedric Carpenter and Lamont Ranson were prosecuted for 
providing material support when they sold illegal driver licenses, birth certificates, 
and social security cards to people they thought were members of a foreign 
terrorist organization, Abu Sayyaf (Bjelopera, 2013, p. 31). There is also subset 
of homegrown terrorists who are radicalized in the United States prior to 
undertaking travel overseas for military training and operational support. These 
radicalized individuals have successfully communicated with terrorist 
organization officials while in the United States and have gained operational 
support for their terrorist activity.  
Just as scholars have not been able to devise a demographic profile of 
homegrown terrorists, neither has there been a conclusive set of factors able to 
predict radicalization. Many channels exist (e.g., social experiences, family ties, 
foreign travel, and religion) and they may all play a role in the radicalization 
6process. Including radicalization channels in the analysis may yield a set of 
common traits or behaviors that are operationally useful for prevention to 
both government and moderate religious communities. Some of these may 
be “pre-radicalization” (Bjelopera, 2013. p. 13) factors, which federal and state 
law enforcement, in collaboration with communities, can use to detect, monitor, 
and ultimately prevent criminality.  
Terrorism enforcement and counterterrorism measures result in a 
tremendous expenditure of taxpayer dollars. For example, The Human Rights 
Watch organization reported that it costs approximately $27,251 annually to 
detain one individual in federal prison (Rona, 2012). In comparison, the 
estimated cost of a major homegrown terrorism case, U.S. v Batiste et al., 
involving a six-person plot to bomb Chicago's Willis Tower and government 
buildings in South Florida exceeded $10 million dollars (Munzenrieder, 2009). In 
addition, it is estimated that billions of dollars have been expended 
for counterterrorism efforts and congressional oversight (Congressional Budget 
Office, 2012). 
A closer look into the specific demographic, social, and behavioral 
characteristics of U.S.-based offenders, stands to reveal patterns in these 
offenders’ lives. By doing so, this study will contribute materially to the growing 
body of scholarship dedicated to uncovering risk factors for radicalization, as well 
as the work aimed at developing prevention strategies to combat homegrown 
terrorism. However, a cautionary note is in order. Given the specificity of the 
7inclusion criteria used, this examination is limited to offenders based in the 
United States and cannot be applied to foreign-based operatives. 
 
Thesis Outline 
Chapter two provides an overview of the literature describing homegrown 
terrorism. Of particular relevance are those studies analyzing case details, as 
well as offender demographic, social, and behavioral characteristics. The 
discussion will also present estimates of the number of terrorist plots, attempted 
attacks, successful attacks, and instances of material support to terrorism 
targeting the United States by U.S.-based individuals.  
Chapter three describes the methods and analysis. This study collected 
information about individual defendants involved in homegrown terrorism crimes 
that resulted in indictments, pleas, or convictions from prosecutions by the United 
States Department of Justice (DOJ) that occurred or were processed post 
September 11, 2001 to March 2014. Individuals being tried in proceedings 
originating out of Guantanamo Bay, Cuba that involved foreign enemy 
combatants prosecuted in military tribunals were excluded. Only individuals who 
are U.S. citizens, permanent residents, or those who have resided in the U.S. for 
at least five years irrespective of their legal status were included in this study. 
The final sample included approximately 194 offenders. The selected cases 
included plots, attacks, and cases of material support to terrorist organizations. 
Cluster analysis was then used to identify groups of homogeneous offenders who 
8shared similar case details and demographic, social, and behavioral 
characteristics.  
Chapter four presents the results of the study. This study hypothesized 
that clusters of terrorists who have attacked within the United States since 9/11 
would not align fully with the three tier categories of homegrown terrorists found 
by Thachuk, Bowman, and Richardson (2008). Instead, it was hypothesized that 
several subgroups would emerge that differentiated offenders based on type of 
involvement (e.g., material support, plotting, or successful attack) and group 
affiliation (e.g., Al Qaeda compared to other groups). It was argued that each 
cluster would exhibit a distinct set of characteristics drawn from each of the four 
categories of case and offender characteristics. 
This study found that while three subgroups exist within the homegrown 
offender pool, each exhibiting a unique configuration of case details, 
demographic, social, and behavioral characteristics, the clusters did not align 
with the level of involvement in terrorist activity or formal group affiliation. The 
study found three clusters of offenders. Those clusters were Cyber Attackers, 
Convert Affiliates, and Trained Allies. These distinctive groups of offenders 
signals a typology of homegrown terrorists that have plotted, attempted to attack, 
attacked, and provided material support to terrorist organizations against the 
United States. The typology signals policy implications to detect and prevent 
future terrorist plots and attacks against the United States.  
9Chapter five discusses the policy implications and limitations of the current 
study. Specifically, the study suggests that certain preventative measures can be 
implemented to avoid future terrorist attacks, such as community outreach 
programs between mental health services, law enforcement, and community 
services. Moreover, the study indicates that it is necessary to closely monitor 
international travel and cyber activity that is associated with radicalization 
channels. Suggestions for the improvement of future research are also 
presented, such as a more detailed examination of mental health issues and 
whether certain mental illnesses, when seen in combination with other 
circumstances, predispose individuals to be influenced by radicalization efforts. 
This line of inquiry would also benefit from future studies that aim to identify 
precursor behavior that leads to terrorist activity. At the end of this paper, two 
appendices are provided to describe the variables and references used in this 
study.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Introduction 
After the 9/11 attacks by Al Qaeda, violent jihadist terrorist plots and 
attacks became a primary concern for agencies involved in law enforcement and 
national security. Homegrown terrorism also became a research focus for 
political, legal, and criminological scholars. While terrorist incidents appeared to 
have peaked in 2009, the 2013 Boston Marathon bombings illustrate that the 
threat to the American homeland continues. “The Congressional Research 
Service (CRS) estimates there have been 63 homegrown violent jihadist plots 
and attacks since 9/11, with 42 of those occurring from 2009 to 2012” (Bjelopera, 
2013, p. 1).   
According to various scholars and congressional officials, homegrown 
terrorism is a growing threat, due to increased radicalization of homegrown 
individuals and the proliferation of plots and attacks against the United States 
that originate within the country (Jenkins, 2010; Pregulman & Burke, 2012; U.S. 
Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 2008; 
Wilner & Dubouloz, 2010). U.S. officials routinely warn about the nature of the 
terrorist threat against the homeland. Attorney General Eric Holder, stated the 
“…United States is facing multidimensional threats which ought to be seen in 
context of a much more varied and longstanding threat picture,” at a 2010 News 
11
Conference after the attempted Times Square Bomb in New York City by Faisal 
Shazhad (as stated in Mantri, 2011, p. 89). In 2011, the Committee on Homeland 
Security in the U.S. House of Representatives, held four hearings to stress the 
present threat by Al Qaeda’s radicalization efforts among Muslim-Americans 
(Kurzman, 2012). 
A key area of concern involves those cases in which terrorist propaganda 
or extremist associates have radicalized U.S. citizens, residents, and domiciled 
visitors. Al Qaeda and its affiliates have evolved beyond their original hierarchical 
operational structure to a multi-channel operation that includes the dissemination 
of propaganda and training materials through Internet blogs, radical websites, 
social networking sites, and jihadist literature (Lahoud et al., 2012). While 
scholars are beginning to investigate homegrown terrorism, a detailed typology of 
offenders that can be used to craft effective intervention strategies is lacking. 
This is partially due to the variety of definitions used for homegrown terrorism 
and the sometimes-limited availability of defendant information.  
Prior attempts to produce a succinct profile or typology of homegrown 
terrorists have failed to identify policy relevant patterns. For instance, it has been 
found that many of these individuals are male, in their 20s at the time of arrest, 
and U.S. citizens (Kurzman, Schanzer, & Moosa, 2011). Some scholars, such as 
Thachuk et al. (2008), argue that homegrown Islamic terrorists fall into one of 
three categories based mainly on citizenship status: legal or illegal immigrants, 
second and third generation Muslims, and converts to Islam (p. 2). However, 
12
homegrown terrorists differ in social circumstances, with variations in their 
occupation, education, and criminal history, among other factors. Other scholars 
have examined paths of radicalization, in attempting to determine what makes a 
homegrown individual become a terrorist (see for example Silber and Bhatt, 
2007). Three radicalization channels are thought to exist; recruitment by terrorist 
officials, self-radicalization, and exposure to Islamic propaganda on the Internet. 
However, these paths are not mutually exclusive. More information needs to be 
collected to identify whether different channels, and combinations thereof, reach 
unique groups of people. In sum, while the existing literature describes how 
terrorist plots are intercepted, a working typology of homegrown terrorists 
remains elusive. Two factors contributing to the limited success of prior studies 
are that a) they used a small set of predictor variables, and b) a lack of robust 
analytic techniques to identify subgroups within the population.   
This chapter will introduce what is currently known about offenders 
involved in homegrown terrorist plots against the United States from post 9/11 to 
March 2014. After summarizing the demographic and social characteristics of 
offenders, this chapter reviews the behavioral characteristics thought to be 
associated with homegrown terrorist activity, such as existence of a criminal 
record, involvement with a radicalized group, being a religious leader, 
international travel, access to weapons and other materials, and conversion to 
Islam. The chapter will then discuss how Al Qaeda influences U.S. persons 
through various radicalization and recruiting channels; including the Internet, 
13
extremist propaganda, and terrorist training, among others. This will then lead 
into a short discussion of the general strain theory because there is some 
suggestion that suffering different types of strain may prime a person toward 
being receptive to radicalization. Next the literature review will discuss how 
defining terrorism affects efforts to identify relevant cases when examining 
homegrown terrorism and how this contributes to the inability of prior scholars to 
craft a useful typology. Finally, the research questions and hypotheses are listed.  
 
Terrorist Characteristics 
Demographic, Social, and Behavioral Characteristics 
There is no single demographic profile for Muslim American terrorist 
suspects and perpetrators (Kurzman, 2012; Kurzman et al., 2011). Kurzman, 
Schanzer, and Moosa (2011) found that over half of the Muslim-American 
suspects were in their 20s at the time of their arrest, the majority were U.S. 
citizens, and came from a wide variety of ethnic backgrounds. In their analysis, 
Kurzman et al. (2011) found that only one of the perpetrators was a female, but 
because she was involved in international terrorism she was not considered a 
homegrown individual. 
Kurzman (2012) found that ethnicity ranged from African American, Arab, 
Somali, South Asian, White, and other. While there were no dominant ethnicities, 
there was an absence of Somali Americans compared to previous years. In a 
subsequent analysis, Kurzman (2013) studied Muslim American perpetrators in 
14
2012 and compared the findings to a prior study: the demographics did not differ 
greatly. 
Kurzman (2013) found that 35 percent of all the Muslim American 
perpetrators since 9/11 were converts to Islam. Moreover, Kurzman (2013) found 
no common educational level among the perpetrators. The same was true for 
occupation; they ranged from working class individuals to unemployed 
individuals. It is important to note that these findings only apply to the offenders 
of plots and attacks. Kurzman (2013) does not discuss the ethnicity, occupation, 
education, and other relevant characteristics of those who provided material 
support to terrorist organizations.  
Thachuk et al. (2008) generated a typology of homegrown terrorist 
individuals that includes three categories. First, there is the category of 
immigrants who have come to the United States for a more prosperous life. 
These individuals are young and tend to pursue a college education. These 
immigrants enter the United States with some kind of permit or through illegal 
means.  
The second category is the second generation, U.S. citizen and non-U.S. 
citizen, children and grandchildren of the first category adults. These individuals 
are also second and third generation Muslims who are following their parents’ 
religion. Thachuk et al. (2008) claims these individuals can feel, at times, as 
outcasts within their new home. As a result, some of these individuals feel 
confused within both cultures; the cultural they were raised in and the newly 
15
acquired American culture. In addition, it is at the time of alienation that these 
second and third generation Muslims feel it necessary to protect Islam from non-
Muslims. As a result, this may be the trigger point in which they commit violent 
acts against the United States.  
The last category consists of individuals who decide to convert to Islam. 
Those that convert do not usually come from a Muslim community or family. They 
convert to Islam to find religious ideology, marital status, or guidance from others 
(Thachuk, Bowman & Richardson, 2008). Many times they convert while in 
prison. For example, there is the case of Hispanic American, Jose Padilla, who 
was recruited into Islam while serving a prison sentence in Miami (Vidino, 2009). 
Many times, authorities are unable to distinguish converts since they are 
instructed not to alter their appearance and blend in with their community 
(Thachuk et al., 2008). 
In comparison to Thachuk et al.’s (2008) categories of terrorists, Vidino’s 
(2009) analysis of homegrown jihadist terrorism in the past 30 years further 
distinguishes homegrown cases by the number of players in the attempted or 
carried out attack, by placing them into clusters and lone wolves. Clusters are 
those who are native or immigrants to the U.S. for a long period of time and have 
formed their terrorist group within the U.S. Lone wolves work by themselves 
without any direct guidance from terrorist leaders (Vidino, 2009). 
An example of a well-known cluster was the “Lackawanna Six,” who were 
sentenced in December 2003 after being trained in Afghanistan by Al Qaeda 
16
(Federal Bureau of Investigation, Counterterrorism Division, 2007). The members 
of the Lackawanna Six were all U.S. naturalized citizens of Yemini descent 
(Federal Bureau of Investigation, Counterterrorism Division, 2007). There was 
also the Portland Seven cluster that provided support to the Taliban in 
Afghanistan (Vidino, 2009). An example of a lone wolf homegrown terrorist is that 
of Derrick Shareef who attempted to buy grenades to bomb a shopping mall in 
Chicago and was arrested after talking to a federal informant (U.S. Department of 
Justice, 2007). 
In his analysis of 20 case studies of homegrown terrorism who were 
affiliated, but not members of Al Qaeda or Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, 
Alexander (2011) found that nearly all the plotters were men, many were 
converts to Islam, and not born in the United States. Further, Alexander (2011) 
found that some had a criminal history, varying degrees of education, and 
differed in their marital and parental statuses. 
Those offenders that were successful in killing people on U.S. soil during 
their attack worked alone and used a handgun on their targets (Alexander, 2011; 
Jenkins, 2010). These cases were that of Hadayat, Haq, and Bledose. Alexander 
(2011) notes that the individuals involved in these 20 case studies were mostly 
influenced by available material online or in some other indirect manner. 
Moreover, these individuals did not receive any formal training and lacked the 
skills to carry out these attacks. It did not take more than some mere planning 
and execution from the offenders. 
17
In another study, by the NYPD, Silber and Bhatt (2007) found that most of 
the homegrown terrorists were men, although an increase of female terrorists 
was noted. However, the role of women in terrorist operations was not as 
attacker or plotter but as a supporter. Additionally, the average age of individuals 
was less than 35. Silber and Bhatt (2007) specifically point to the characteristics 
of these individuals that would make them unnoticeable to law enforcement and 
Americans surrounding them: they look like any other citizen, are involved in their 
community, and have ordinary jobs (Silber & Bhatt, 2007). Lastly, Silber and 
Bhatt (2007) found that these terrorists tend to be second and third generation 
immigrants living in the United States. This compliments the characteristics that 
Thachuk et al. (2008) describes within the three categories of homegrown 
terrorists. Again, it is important to note that the analysis done by Silber and Bhatt 
(2007) does not include all cases of homegrown terrorism. The authors decided 
to include only five total plots in order to study the radicalization and 
characteristics of these homegrown terrorists more closely.  
 
Terrorism and the Internet 
Radicalization 
Homegrown terrorists often use basic tools found on the Internet to 
facilitate and support their terrorist operations. With the increased use of the 
Internet, homegrown individuals no longer have to await recruitment or specific 
instructions in plotting attacks against the United States. Terrorist organizations, 
18
like Al Qaeda and al-Shabaab, are taking advantage of the Internet to influence 
recruits. Al Qaeda and other terrorist propaganda is readily available to access, 
share, and self-radicalize homegrown individuals. Scholars conclude that this 
online propaganda and cyber jihadism, allows radicalized individuals to create 
various social platforms to preach their ideology and follow the ideology of 
others. 
Thachuk et al. (2008) state “[T]he Internet allows groups to create and 
identify dedicated insiders—and to maintain fervor in those already dedicated to 
the cause—on a global scale” (p. 3). It also provides an opportunity for 
individuals to self-radicalize, such as naturalized citizen, Samir Khan, who was 
able to easily create Islamic propaganda on the Internet (Thachuk et al., 2008). 
Khan, who was eventually killed in Yemen, did not have to leave his house to 
radicalize others and give advice on how to fight jihad over the Internet. 
The following are just some examples of homegrown terrorists who have 
used the different mechanisms of the Internet to support their terrorist attacks 
and plots. 
• Mohamed Osman Mohamud used Google street view to survey his target 
location in Portland, Oregon (Pregulman & Burke, 2012). 
• Tarek Mehanna and co-conspirators, who were charged with terrorism, 
translated terrorist propaganda from Arabic to English and shared them 
on violent Islamic websites (Bjelopera, 2013). 
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• Samir Khan eventually became an editor of Al Qaeda’s Inspire magazine, 
which includes articles on bomb-making instructions and methods to 
murder Americans. (U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, 2012). 
Terrorist organizations no longer restrict their ideological websites, forums, 
or blogs from the public. Homegrown terrorists can now search for others who 
are seeking the same guidance or find others to ultimately conspire against the 
United States. For example, social networking sites like Twitter and Facebook 
are used to post jihadist speeches and share links to other Islamic websites and 
other terrorism content. These social media platforms also allow other like-
minded individuals to “like” or repost content, therefore spreading the popularity 
of the specific user and its content on a much faster and larger scale. For 
instance, al-Shabaab’s rap video on YouTube, Blow By Blow, discussed the 
history of the fight for jihad (U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, 2012). As of May 22, 2014, the Blow by Blow video has 
had a total of 21,623 views on YouTube (AbuAyrow, 2009).  
Al Qaeda no longer restricts its recruitment efforts to foreign language 
speakers. For example, in 2007, the terrorist organization made an effort to make 
their online materials more accessible by posting in English and adding subtitles 
to its videos (U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs, 2008). In addition, speeches by terrorist leaders, such as al-Zawahiri, 
appeals to U.S.-based jihadist individuals by directly calling on “…blacks in 
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America, people of color, American Indians, Hispanics, and all other 
oppressed…” (U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs, 2008, p. 7). Radicalized individuals do not necessarily have to travel 
abroad for training due to the large array of YouTube videos and online literature. 
In an analysis of YouTube jihadist channels, Klausen, Barbieri, Reichlin-
Melnick, and Zelin (2012) found that in a period of three months, 41 YouTube 
accounts were found with jihadist content. More specifically, these accounts 
resembled extremist propaganda of a British banned terrorist organization, al-
Muhajiroun, but nonetheless inspired by Al Qaeda. Their study concluded that all 
41 accounts were separate channels but, in fact, they were organized and 
controlled by al-Mujahiroun. Klausen et al. (2012) notes that this kind of 
multiplicity of YouTube channels is an effort to create more busy work, and 
ultimately to drain more law enforcement resources, as there is a larger amount 
of material to sift through and attempt to delete. An investigative report by the 
U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (2012) 
states that there is a rising trend in computer literacy among radicalized 
individuals and that many use the Internet in furtherance of their terrorist 
activities.  
Scholars have not found a specific path to radicalization (Silber & Bhatt, 
2007). Instead, it has been found that individuals may radicalize due to different 
events, social influences, or dramatic experiences throughout their lives. Some 
examples of avenues of radicalization are interaction with terrorist organization 
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members or recruiters, self-radicalization through the Internet and Islamic 
literature, peer influences, overseas travel, and incarceration (U.S. Senate, 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 2008). Internet use, 
specifically the availability of propaganda material, recruitment content, and 
videos on social networking sites draw connections to radicalization means for 
homegrown   offenders. These radicalization factors point to social activity 
signaling specific use of the Internet in furtherance of terrorist activity. Similarly, 
negative experiences or life events may also lead toward terrorist behavior.  
 
Strain 
Just as the path to radicalization is not concrete, there is no specific path 
to criminality either. However, studies have supported Robert Agnew’s (1992) 
general strain theory, which defines three types of strain or pressures that 
individual’s experience, which can lead to delinquency in attempting to cope with 
those strains. Agnew’s (1992) general strain theory is based on the idea that 
when people experience negative life events they are more inclined to engage in 
criminal activity. There are three major types of strain; the individual’s inability to 
achieve desired goals, the loss of meaningful relationships or valuables, and the 
unforeseen negative experiences (Agnew, 1992).  
Agnew (1992) found that individuals who failed to achieve positively 
valued goals, such as financial prosperity, status and respect, and autonomy are 
more apt to get involved in criminal behavior. Those individuals who are not able 
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to attain these achievements under normal circumstances resort to crime to 
achieve them due to its importance in their life. The loss of positively valued 
stimuli can also cause strain. Loss refers to a broken relationship with a friend or 
a theft of a valued object, like a car. This then leads the individual to delinquency 
because he or she attempts to prevent the loss, retrieve what has been taken 
away, or seeks revenge for what has happened. Lastly, presentation of negative 
stimuli refers to abuse, negative school experiences, homelessness, and others. 
These negative experiences may lead individuals to break the law in order to 
escape such situations.  
 Agnew’s (1992) general strain theory is reflected in a more specific 
example of negative experiences faced by individuals that may lead to 
delinquency, such as injustices in the criminal justice system and its procedures. 
For example, homegrown terrorists may feel that law enforcement’s questioning 
and scrutiny of their religious ideology as unjust and thus may revenge against or 
engage in criminal activity. Scheuereman (2013) examined the effects of 
interactional, procedural, and distributive injustices and delinquency. The study 
indicated a likelihood of violence when the offenders experienced procedural 
injustice. The individuals of the study expected the procedures to be consistent 
across all cases, non-bias decisions, and fairness for all those involved. 
Instances in which procedural justice was present, the individuals felt no control 
over the situation, since it was believed no one was at an advantage over anyone 
else.  
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Moreover, if procedural injustice is present, the individual feels anger, 
resentment, and betrayal leading to violent activity. The study found that when 
individuals experienced procedural injustice, they were 2.40 times more likely to 
respond violently to the situation than if they experienced any of the other two 
injustices (Scheuerman, 2013, p. 380). These findings support Agnew’s (1992) 
general strain theory in which individuals may seek revenge or feel betrayal from 
their inability to cope with the experienced strain and therefore commit criminal 
offenses.  
Scheuerman’s (2013) study can be applied to individuals who convert to 
Islam while they are incarcerated, who then engage in acts of terrorism. These 
individuals may feel anger, resentment, or betrayal by the criminal justice system 
when initially prosecuted for other crimes. It may well be the case that these 
individuals who were convicted, felt betrayed by their country, resorted to other 
Muslim inmates and Islam ideology for guidance and revenge against the United 
States. Procedural injustices can indicate precursors to terrorist activity by U.S. 
offenders. 
 
Al Qaeda Presence in the United States 
As discussed previously, Al Qaeda is now made up of various cells and 
individuals who seek to attack the United States. The number of Al Qaeda 
operational groups continues to increase, Thachuk et al. (2008) report 40 and 
counting since January 2005. Al Qaeda has increasingly used the Internet to 
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reach recruits in the United States. According to Pregulman and Burke (2012), 
Al Qaeda may soon choose to virtually train their recruits due to the enormous 
volumes of online propaganda available to homegrown individuals who follow 
their ideology. 
U.S. officials are now referring to Al Qaeda inspired plots and attacks as 
franchised terrorism due to Osama bin Laden’s decentralization leadership since 
the beginning of the war on terrorism in 1996. Al Qaeda depends, in part, on self-
radicalized individuals already residing in the United States to commit violent 
attacks. Since not all participants of Al Qaeda in the United States directly 
communicate with Al Qaeda, Sageman (2008) refers to them as wannabes of a 
new social movement. As previously discussed, these individuals turn to 
available electronic literature and propaganda for guidance. Due to Al Qaeda’s 
changing organizational structure, Bruce Hoffman and Marc Sageman disagree 
on whether the threat stems from radicalized participants who meet and plot on 
the Internet or from Al Qaeda organization members (Sciolino & Schmitt, 2008). 
Ultimately, Al Qaeda remains a terrorist organization with flexibility in 
both recruiting and operational tactics in fighting the United States. 
 
Capturing the Extent of Homegrown Terrorism 
The literature previously discussed provides some insight into the 
characteristics of individuals who commit acts of homegrown terrorism against 
the United States. A common profile of homegrown terrorists has not been 
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established from current research, although some common demographic 
characteristics have been found among them, such as U.S. citizenship, in their 
20s at time of arrest, mostly men; variations are present among offender 
demographics (Kurzman et al., 2011). One scholar, Thachuk et al. (2008) has 
categorized homegrown terrorist individuals into three different categories, 
ranging from alienated first generation immigrants to socially isolated converts to 
Islam that decide to act against the United States. While Thachuk et al. (2008) 
offer a useful starting point, a more detailed typology may be constructed by 
analyzing a broad set of homegrown individuals that commit acts of terrorism 
within the United States. 
Defining Homegrown Terrorism 
There are many definitions for homegrown terrorism. The definitions vary 
across law enforcement agencies as well as throughout studies conducted by 
academia. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines terrorism as “the 
unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or 
coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in 
furtherance of political or social objectives” (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
n.d.). More specifically, in their 2002-2005 terrorism publication, the FBI defined 
domestic terrorism as: 
the unlawful use, or threatened use, of force or violence by a group or  
individual based and operating entirely within the United States or Puerto 
Rico without foreign direction committed against persons or property to 
26
intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment 
thereof in furtherance of political or social objectives. (Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, Counterterrorism Division, 2007)  
The DOJ, National Security Division, which prosecutes terrorism cases, defines 
domestic terrorism as: 
acts within the U.S. that are dangerous to human life, violate federal or  
state criminal laws, have no actual connection to international terrorists, 
and appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, 
influence domestic government policy through intimidation or coercion, or 
affect the conduct of our government by mass destruction, assassination 
or kidnapping. (U.S. Department of Justice, Offices of the United States 
Attorneys, n.d.).    
White (2006) discusses the complexity of defining terrorism due to 
controversy in its application and contradictions among the legal statutes. 
Definitions of terrorism often vary based on the agency’s priorities and mission 
objectives. Some definitions are more specific than others, encompass a larger 
group of people than others, and address different dimensions in each. Hoffman 
(1998) notes that the FBI’s definition of terrorism, unlike the State Department’s 
definition, addresses the psychological dimension of the terrorist act since it 
acknowledges those actions in which the individual intimidates or uses coercive 
measures towards their target. Nonetheless, Hoffman (1998) notes that the 
Department of Defense’s definition of terrorism is the most complete because it 
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highlights the threats of terrorism as much as the acts of violence and considers 
the religious, ideological, and political objectives of the offense. Similar to the 
complexity of defining terrorism, variations occur when defining homegrown 
terrorism. 
Most law enforcement agencies, like the FBI, use their domestic terrorism 
definitions to encompass homegrown terrorism. While an act of homegrown 
terrorism usually has some religious, ideological, or political objective in mind, it 
is the particular offender, target, and location of the violent act that distinguishes 
this specific type of terrorism. The Center for Strategic and International Studies 
defines homegrown terrorism as “extremist violence perpetrated by U.S citizens 
or legal U.S. residents, and linked to or inspired by Al Qaeda’s brand of radical 
Sunni Islamism” (Pregulman & Burke, 2012, p. 1). Bjelopera (2013) defines 
homegrown terrorism as “terrorist activity or plots perpetrated within the United 
States or abroad by American citizens, legal permanent residents, or visitors 
radicalized within the United States” (Summary section, para. 1).  
Consistency in defining homegrown terrorism would yield more robust 
results across varying studies in academia and law enforcement alike, which 
would then lead to improved policy implications. Lastly, a concrete definition of 
homegrown terrorism and homegrown offenders would present researchers with 
a mechanism to filter through terrorism cases in order to only include homegrown 
terrorism attacks in their research.   
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Deciding Which Cases to Include 
According to various studies, the number of homegrown Islamic plots in 
the United States in the post September 11 period ranges from 63 to 188 owing 
to different definitions and inclusion criteria (Bergen et al., 2012; Bjelopera, 2013; 
Jenkins, 2010; Southern Poverty Law Center, 2011). These cases of terrorism 
range from plots, attacks, attempted attacks, violent jihad training, and material 
support to terrorist organizations. Similarly, the Heritage Foundation, which 
conducts research on various disciplines, has kept track of terrorist plots since 
the attacks of 9/11. In their latest report, the Heritage Foundation (Zuckerman, 
Bucci, & Carfano, 2013) reported 60 terrorist plots and attacks against the United 
States (See Figure 1. The number of terrorist plots and attacks, by year, from 
2001 to 2013 in Appendix A). More specifically, 53 of those terrorist plots were 
prevented before terrorists acted upon them, 4 were successful attacks, and 3 
were prevented by civilians. Most importantly, 49 of these cases were 
homegrown terrorist plots and attacks.  
Dahl (2011) states there was an average of 9 plots per year (including 
overseas and domestic extremist) from 2005 to 2009, the peak years. In 2010, 
the number increased to 13, but that includes 2 overseas plots and a domestic 
extremist plot (Dahl, 2011). Other scholars have tracked the number of 
homegrown terrorist plots by Muslim Americans. 
Kurzman’s (2011) study of Muslim-American terrorists found that Muslim 
American suspects and perpetrators peaked in 2009, with an average of more 
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than 40 per year compared to the average of 14 in prior years (para. 1). In 2012, 
Kurzman found that Muslim-American terrorism had decreased in 2011. 
Specifically, there were “20 Muslim Americans indicted for violent plots in 2011, 
compared to 26 in 2010” (Kurzman, 2012, “Muslim-American Terrorism Down in 
2011”, para. 1). In total, there were 193 indicted Muslim-Americans for violent 
plots since 9/11 (Kurzman, 2012).   
While Congressional officials have warned of a potential increase in plots 
and attacks by Muslim Americans, evidence contradicts these claims. In the last 
two years, there has been a decrease since the peak in 2009. Kurzman (2012) 
found that this decrease is due to the number of individuals successfully carrying 
out attacks, rather than just plotting. In 2010, six Muslim Americans carried out 
attacks, whereas in 2011, only one individual did; Yonathan Melaku (Kurzman, 
2012). Melaku was prosecuted for a shooting incident at military buildings in 
Virginia (Kurzman, 2012). 
As discussed, research entities like the Heritage Foundation and The New 
American Foundation, law enforcement agencies, and scholars have also kept a 
record of terrorist attacks, but none have compiled a comprehensive data set of 
acts of homegrown terrorism, to include both attacks and plots. For instance, The 
Global Terrorism Database maintained by the National Consortium for the Study 
of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) does not include those 
instances where attacks were attempted but unsuccessful due to intervention by 
authorities (Dahl, 2011). Also, the National Counterterrorism Center tracks 
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incidents, but does not include plots that were never initiated or attempted (Dahl, 
2011). While these agencies and organizations hold valuable information on 
some terrorist incidents, they are not enough to get a complete picture of 
homegrown terrorists acting against the United States. 
In his study, Dahl (2011) examines unsuccessful terrorist plots since 1987 
to October 2010, with a total of 176 attacks. However, only 103 were considered 
domestic attacks, but those included right wing and antigovernment extremism. 
Dahl’s (2011) findings do not give insight to the demographic characteristics of 
the perpetrators involved in the attacks. Dahl’s (2011) research does not provide 
an exact number of homegrown plots and attacks by U.S. persons within the 
United States. Moreover, Dahl’s (2011) analysis does not include instances of 
material support to terrorism by homegrown individuals. 
Jenkins (2010) states there have been a “total of 46 cases of domestic 
radicalization and recruitment to jihadist terrorism” (Preface section, para. 2) 
between September 2001 and 2009. Those incidents include domestic 
individuals who were accused of providing material support and those who 
traveled overseas. “While incidents of homegrown terrorism decreased slightly in 
2011 from their peak in 2009 and 2010, such acts continue to occur with 
disturbing frequency” (Pregulman & Burke, 2012, p. 2). Jenkins (2010) reports 
there have been “more cases of radicalization in 2009 than any year since Sept 
11, 2001” (p. 1).   
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Homegrown terrorism has evolved into acts of violence committed by 
American citizens, naturalized citizens, and those that have remained in the 
United States for a long period of time. As Jenkins (2010) states, “America's 
perception of the terrorist threat today differs greatly from the perception of 35 
years ago (p. 25).” The 1970s was a unique decade for terrorism. Bombings on 
U.S. soil represented American terrorism at the time. The current terrorism 
experience is that of radicalized and non-radicalized individuals plotting and 
carrying out terrorist attacks on U.S. soil. However, unlike the terrorists of 9/11, 
homegrown terrorists are native to the country they are attacking and represent a 
unique, yet diverse group of offenders. 
A 2012 policy report by the Muslim Affairs Council reported a total of “135 
plots by U.S. originated non-Muslim perpetrators against the United States since 
9/11” (Beutel, 2012, p. 2), but that includes racist, anti-government, and animal 
liberation movements related plots. Moreover, there have been “60 total plots by 
U.S. and foreign-originated Muslim perpetrators since 9/11,” but that includes 
both U.S. territory and abroad (Beutel, 2012, p. 4). 
There have been more cases of material support to terrorist organizations 
than actual terrorist attacks and plots (Thachuk et al., 2008; Kurzman, 2012). 18 
United States Code (U.S.C.) Section (§) 2339A, providing material support to 
terrorists is defined as “any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including 
currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, 
lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safe houses, false documentation 
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or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal 
substances, explosives, personnel” (Cornell University Law School, Legal 
Information Institute, n.d.). According to Kurzman (2012), since 9/11, there have 
been 462 Muslim Americans indicted for material support to terrorist 
organizations, almost double of those for violent plots or attacks. However, this 
figure must be taken with caution since it includes cases the FBI classified as 
“terrorism-related” in 2010, although they did not involve terrorism charges 
(Kurzman, 2012, “Support for Terrorism,” para. 2).  
Hassan Moussa Makki, Sayed Mustajab Shah, and Earnest James 
Ujaama are just a few of the homegrown terrorist individuals that have been 
convicted of providing material support to terrorist organizations and other 
charges. These individuals were involved in funding Hezbollah through cigarette 
contraband and drug trafficking funds to support the Taliban (Thachuk et al., 
2008). It was noted in Kurzman’s (2012) study that, in recent cases, material 
supporters handled a lesser volume of currency in their offenses. The largest 
amount that has been seen was more than a million dollars and the lowest 
amount was less than $100,000 (Kurzman, 2012). However, it should be noted 
that the actual dollar amount involved is not known for all cases. It is difficult for 
law enforcement to detect these individuals since they are not committing a 
specific terrorist attack (Pregulman & Burke, 2012). 
  Unlike the inconsistent tracking of terrorist plots and attacks, there is a 
more comprehensive account of successful terrorist attacks and associated 
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casualties since 9/11. There have been a total of 33 fatalities since 9/11 from 
successful plots and attacks (Kurzman, 2012). While the number of casualties 
does not compare to the number of attempted and successful attacks, it remains 
a concern for the American people and law enforcement personnel. Nonetheless, 
variations of definitions of homegrown terrorism and differing criteria used 
by scholars and law enforcement to determine homegrown individuals makes it 
difficult to know the exact number of homegrown plots and attacks against the 
United States since 9/11.  
Due to the inconsistencies in the definition of terrorism, the number of total 
homegrown terrorism plots is not concrete. Scholars and agencies have tracked 
these incidents through different definitions and therefore the numbers do not 
align with each other. Until all terrorist plots and attacks are examined by one 
single definition, the true count of terrorist incidents will not be uncovered and 
therefore be properly examined.   
 
Research Aims and Hypotheses 
Since past studies did not use a comprehensive set of cases and clear 
inclusion criteria to examine only U.S. citizens, legal residents, and those who 
have resided in the United States for a long period of time, efforts to generate a 
useful offender typology have failed. It is also expected that broadening the list of 
covariates will generate a more useful offender classification schema.  
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 Three research questions drive this study. First, this study sought to 
determine whether all homegrown terrorist individuals fall within the three 
categories found by Thachuk et al. (2008). And if not, is there sufficient evidence 
that unique offender profiles could be generated among the individuals living in 
the United States whom have engaged in homegrown terrorism activity? And 
finally, is it possible to craft an offender typology that is specific enough to inform 
interdiction strategies? Based on the literature reviewed, it is expected that these 
questions would be tested with the following hypotheses. 
 
1. Individuals residing in the United States who have been involved in 
terrorist activity since 9/11 will not align fully with the 3 tier categories 
of homegrown terrorists found by Thachuk et al. (2008).  
2. Instead, it is hypothesized that the study will find several clusters, each 
with a different set of characteristics drawn from each of the four 
categories of case and offender characteristics (demographic, social, 
and behavioral characteristics, as well as case details). These clusters 
will align with: 
a. Level of involvement, meaning that a unique profile will emerge for 
individuals providing material support compared to those plotting 
attacks, being unsuccessful at operationalizing a plan, and those 
launching successful attacks. 
35
b. Type of group affiliation, meaning unique profiles will be evident for 
Al Qaeda linked terrorists compared to other groups.  
3. The offender subgroups will be distinct enough to generate unique 
interdiction and crime prevention policy.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Introduction 
This study aimed to develop a typology of homegrown terrorists that can 
support investigation efforts and will help generate effective prevention 
strategies. This chapter begins with a description of the sampling process that 
generated approximately 115 homegrown terrorism cases that were handled by 
U.S. federal courts between September 11, 2011 and March 2014. Next, the 
chapter reviews the data collection process used to obtain information about the 
case details, demographic, social, and behavioral characteristics of those who 
have chosen to plot, attack, attempted to attack, or have provided material 
support to terrorist organizations. The chapter also presents the various types of 
sources of information that were used and their completeness and reliability is 
discussed. A description of the two-step cluster analysis used to generate the 
typology is also presented. The chapter concludes with statistical representations 
and descriptions of the bivariate correlations performed among the case details 
and offender characteristics that were utilized in the study.      
 
Sample 
The sample was generated from 115 federal homegrown cases handled 
by the U.S. Department of Justice since the Al Qaeda attacks of September 11, 
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2001. Cases were identified from existing lists of homegrown jihadist cases 
compiled by various research organizations and federal law enforcement 
agencies, such as the FBI, The Southern Poverty Law Center, The Heritage 
Foundation, The New American Foundation, The Investigative Project on 
Terrorism, and others. To supplement this list of cases, additional searches were 
made using Google’s search engine using the following terms: “homegrown 
terrorism cases,” “homegrown terrorism cases since 9/11,” “domestic terrorism 
cases,” and “domestic jihadist terrorist cases.” All cases, with at least one 
defendant that satisfies the definition of a homegrown terrorist were included in 
the study.   
The cases being examined generated approximately 194 individuals that 
were involved in homegrown terrorism plots, attacks, attempted attacks, and 
material support to terrorist organizations. Some of the cases involved multiple 
offenders (up to 12), and in some cases multiple homegrown terrorist offenders. 
Since some of the cases involved foreign-based individuals (non-U.S. persons), 
the number of non-U.S. persons involved in each case was noted but individual 
information was not collected. The sample did not include those defendants who 
had their charges dismissed or those tried in state court. The sample excluded 
trials originating out of Guantanamo Bay, Cuba that involved foreign enemy 
combatants prosecuted in military tribunals.    
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Data Collection 
Information about defendants in these 115 cases was obtained through 
publicly available sources, such as DOJ Press Releases, official court 
documents, official government reports, government websites, research 
organizations, and media articles and reports. The unit of analysis was the 
offender: each offender was coded separately. In total, 34 variables were 
constructed, this includes case details (5 variables) and offender characteristics 
(29 variables) divided into: personal demographics (e.g., age, sex, citizenship, 
ethnicity affiliation, education, etc.); social characteristics (e.g., reported religious 
affiliation, former military experience, and radicalization to terrorism); strain 
(failure to achieve positive valued goals, loss of positive valued stimuli, and 
presence of negative stimuli); and behavioral characteristics (e.g., reported  
criminal history, reported Imam leader, offender type, etc.) Described below (See 
Appendix B for a complete list of variables), these variables were used for the 
typology for two reasons: first, these characteristics are supported in the extant 
literature as being key factors differentiating offenders; and second, these 
variables represent the kind of information that would be easily available to law 
enforcement throughout the course of a criminal investigation on terrorism. 
Variables 
Case Details. Five variables captured case details for each offense: type 
of offense, terrorist organization affiliation, number of offenders involved, number 
of U.S.-based co-conspirators, and number of co-conspirators who were non-
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U.S. persons. The type of offense was determined mainly by whether the 
offender was able to carry out a plot or not, or if their crime was providing 
material support to a terrorist organization. Therefore, description of offense was 
coded as 1 = Material Support to Terrorism/Conspiracy to Provide Material 
Support to Terrorism, 2 = Plot to Attack, 3 = Attempted Attack, and 4 = 
Successful Attack. Terrorist organization affiliation refers to the specific terrorist 
organization affiliated with the offense, coded as 1 = Al Qaeda, 2 = other, and 3 = 
none. Details for the number of offenders, both U.S. persons and non-U.S. 
persons were collected for each case. The number of offenders involved, number 
of co-conspirators involved, and number of co-conspirators who were non-U.S. 
persons were all coded as a continuous variable.   
Demographic Characteristics. Nine variables captured demographic 
characteristics: age, gender, citizenship status, immigrant generation, ethnicity, 
education, occupation, reported marital status, and reported to have children. 
The individual’s age was coded as a continuous variable by years old. Gender 
was coded as simply 1 = male and 0 = female. Citizenship status at time of 
offense/arrest will fall into one of five categories, based on legal status: 1 = U.S. 
Citizen (U.S. born), 2 = Naturalized U.S. Citizen (non-U.S. born), 3 = Legal 
Permanent Resident (LPR), 4 = Visa holder (student, tourist), or 5 = 
undocumented (illegally residing in the country). The offender’s generation level 
of immigrating to the United States was coded as 1 = 3rd generation, 2 = 2nd 
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generation, 3 = 1st generation. The offender’s ethnicity affiliation was recorded as 
text, and then recoded as a social/cultural group or nation of origin.   
The offender’s level of education was coded as 1 = less than high school, 
2 = completed high school, 3 = technical school, non-college, 4 = some college, 5 
= completed college (BA/BS), 6 = some graduate school, 7 = completed graduate 
school (M.A.), or 8 = some/completed Doctorate (Ph.D.). The offender’s 
occupation fell under three different categories. Those categories were 1 = 
Professional (physicians, architect, teachers), 2 = Semi-Skilled (police, military, 
mechanics, small business owners, and students), and 3 = Unskilled/None. 
Reported marital status at the time of offense/arrest was coded as 1 = married or 
0 = unmarried. Lastly, the reported to have children variable was coded as 1 = if 
the offender had one or more children or 0 = if the offender was known to not 
have any children.  
Social Characteristics. Eight variables measured social characteristics: 
reported religious affiliation, reported former military involvement/training, 
reported suffering from or diagnosed mental illness, and five factors of terrorism 
influence and radicalization means. 
The offender’s reported religious affiliation was recorded as text. Reported 
former military involvement or training within the United States was simply coded 
as 1 = yes or 0 = No. Mental illness was coded using a scale computed by 
summing the offender’s reported suffering from or diagnosed mental condition, 
coded as 1 = for each condition or 0 = if none. The defendant was considered to 
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have a mental illness history if at some point he or she received any psychiatric 
care or was diagnosed with a mental illness prior to or during their criminal 
proceedings. Those conditions are: 1) mental health issues, mentally troubled, or 
mentally ill, 2) schizophrenia, 3) hallucinations, 4) bipolar disorder, 5,) 
depression, 6) anxiety, and 7) Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).  
Terrorism influence and reported radicalization was coded as five different 
variables. The first variable indicated whether the defendant was radicalized via 
the Internet as 1 = yes or 0 = no. The remaining four variables specified the type 
of radicalization means; social networking sites (ex: Facebook) 1 = yes or 0 = no, 
extremist propaganda (ex: Inspire Magazine) 1 = yes or 0 = no, email or direct 
contact with a terrorist official(s) 1 = yes or 0 = no, and overseas training with 
terrorist organizations 1 = yes or 0 = no. To be coded as 1 for using a social 
networking site, the defendant must have been influenced by speeches or other 
material available by terrorist leaders via YouTube, Twitter, or other social 
networking sites. Extremist propaganda refers to situations where defendants 
were known to have read Muslim, jihadist, or other materials encouraging violent 
acts against the United States. Lastly, overseas training captures overseas travel 
for violent (jihad) training from terrorist organizations.    
Strain. The amount of strain or stress the offender experienced in their life 
was recorded using 3 factors: failure to achieve positive goals, loss of positive 
experiences or acquisitions (positive valued stimuli), and the presentation of 
negative experiences or losses (negative valued stimuli).  All three were 
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measured by summing the offender’s life events/occurrences in which they 
experienced each type of strain. Failure to achieve positive goals was measured 
using the following examples of strain: 1) acquisition of wealth, 2) status and 
respect, and 3) autonomy. Loss of positive experiences or acquisitions was 
measured using the following examples of strain: 1) death of friend/romantic 
partner, 2) divorce, 3) separation, 4) theft of a valued object, 5) loss of a good 
job, and 6) loss of a car for a period of time. Lastly, the presentation of negative 
experiences or loss was measured using the following examples of strain: 1) 
abusive parent, 2) boss who puts undue strain on individual, 3) parental 
unemployment, 4) deaths in the family, 5) illnesses in the family, 6) 
homelessness, and 7) economic hardship/poverty.  
Behavioral Characteristics. Eight variables were used to measure 
behavioral characteristics: reported criminal history, offender type, role of 
offender within group, reported Imam leader, reported international travel, 
instrumentality, convert to Islam, and prior religion before converting to Islam. 
Criminal history was simply coded as 1 = having a criminal background or 0 = not 
having a criminal background. The criterion for having a criminal background was 
based on any prior arrests or convictions within the United States. The offender 
type refers to the method in which the terrorist offense was carried out, 1 if 
carried out alone or 2 if acted with others in a group. Additionally, the role of the 
offender within the group was measured by and coded as 1 = leader or 2 = non-
leader.  
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Reported Imam leader was coded simply as 1 = yes or 0 = No. The 
reported international travel variable was measured by indicating whether the 
offender traveled outside of the United States in pursuit of guidance, training, 
funding, etc. in furtherance of their offense. Reported international travel was 
coded as 1 = yes or 0 = no. The instrumentality involved refers to the weapon the 
offender actually used or had discussed to use in their terrorist operation. The 
following categories captured the intended or actual use of materials during the 
attack: 1 = weapons (e.g., handguns, WMD), 2 = general supplies, 3 = 
explosives, 4 = safe houses and support (e.g., target lists, passports, driver’s 
licenses, surveillance, etc.), 5 = funding, 6 = jihad training, and 7 = multiple 
instrumentalities. Conversion to Islam/Muslim, was coded as 1 = yes, 0 = no. 
Lastly, the offender’s prior religion before converting to Islam was recorded as 
text.  
 
Data Quality and Concerns 
To ensure the most accurate information was used, sources were 
assessed and data from the most highly ranked source was preferred. The 
highest ranked data used in this study were official court documents. The data 
was collected mainly from Department of Justice court documents, such as 
indictments, criminal complaints, judgments, sentencing memorandums, and 
others. Moreover, press releases were also examined to gather the necessary 
information. Those instances in which the information was incomplete, that is, not 
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all court documents are available; the researcher turned to media reports and 
articles that discussed specific details and characteristics of the case and 
offender(s) involved. Reporters can easily make mistakes when collecting 
information for their journal articles and news reports. Since a different level of 
investigatory rigor may be applied to each case, media sources are also apt to 
suffer from reliability issues.  
Media sources were essential to the data collection process since they   
include specific details about the offender’s background that are not noted in the 
legal documents. This information is often derived from interviews and other 
sources of information, such as public records and previous publications of the 
offenders’ achievements. Nonetheless, the offenders’ characteristics were 
collected in order to have the most complete amount of information as possible. 
The researcher only recorded information that was found credible and found 
among multiple sources. That is, information that differed among sources was 
not recorded. Therefore, the information had to match among the sources to be 
recorded in the final coding of the variables. This was done to ensure the most 
accurate information possible was collected and recorded.    
 
 Data Analysis Procedures 
This study aimed to derive an offender typology useful for profiling 
homegrown terrorists. The first step was to examine bivariate correlations among 
event details and each set of characteristics. Following the bivariate coefficient 
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correlations, two-step cluster analysis was conducted using all variables, except 
immigrant generation. The aim of a cluster analysis was to partition offenders into 
number of groups or clusters that were maximally similar or homogeneous with 
respect to a number of selected variables. Specifically, the study utilized the two-
step cluster method since both continuous and categorical variables were 
collected. 
In this cluster analysis, the log-likelihood distance was used to form 
clusters. Clusters are identified with a process based on the reduction of the log-
likelihood distance (Zhang, Ramakrishnon, & Livny, 1996; Chiu, Fang, Chen, 
Wang, & Jeris, 2001). This means that groups are combined into clusters if a 
decrease in log-likelihood is observed. This hierarchical clustering process 
assumes normal distributions for continuous and multinomial categorical 
variables (Zhang et al., 1996; Chiu et al., 2001). It is also assumed that the 
variables are independent of each other. No missing values are allowed (Zhang 
et al., 1996; Chiu et al., 2001); list wise deletion of cases occurred.  
When conducting the two-step cluster analysis, the number of clusters 
was set to be determined automatically with a maximum of 15 clusters.  Lastly, 
the Schwarz’s Bayesian Criterion (BIC) was used to determine the number of 
optimal clusters. Comparing ratio of change in successive analyses determines 
whether merging groups and thus reducing the number of clusters improved the 
fit of the model (Zhang et al., 1996; Chiu et al., 2001). Offense type and terrorist 
affiliation variables were used to test/confirm the clusters. The final stage of 
46
analysis involved generating a cluster cross-tabulation with the results of the final 
cluster classification for the two models: type of offense and terrorist affiliation. 
The combination of these analyses generated unique offender subgroups. All 
analyses were conducted using IBM SPSS Statistics version 21.  
 
Description of the Sample 
Case Details 
Table 3.1 shows the type of offenses included in the sample along with the 
terrorist affiliation of the defendants.  Most cases involved situations where 
offenders provided material support to terrorist organizations and the majority of 
the individuals were affiliated with Al Qaeda (34.0 %). 
 
 
Table 3.1 
Description of Case Details 
Variable Valid Percent 
(n) 
% 
Missing 
Offense Type (194) 0.0 
Material Support to Terrorism 64.4  
Plot to Attack 29.4  
Attempted Attack 4.6  
Successful Attack 1.5  
Terrorist organization 
affiliation 
(194) 0.0 
Al Qaeda 34.0  
Other 43.8  
None 22.2  
Note. The total sample includes 194 individuals 
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Table 3.2 describes the number of offenders and number of co-
conspirators (both U.S. persons and non-U.S. persons).  The number of 
offenders involved in a single terrorist incident ranged from 1 to 12 individuals. 
When plots or attacks involved co-conspirators, there was an average of 2.7 U.S. 
persons present. The mean for the number of non-U.S. persons involved was 
much less (.57). 
 
 
Table 3.2 
Descriptive Statistics for Key Independent Variables 
Variable Mean (Standard Deviation) Range (min-max) 
Number of offenders 3.82 (3.23) 11 (1-12) 
Number of co-
conspirators 
2.77 (3.26) 11 (0-11) 
Number of co-
conspirators non-U.S. 
persons 
.57 (1.23) 5  (0-5) 
Age 31.72 (11.48) 58 (17-75) 
Note. The total sample includes 194 individuals. 
 
 
Demographic Characteristics 
Table 3.3 reports offender demographics. Of the 194 offenders, 186 were 
male and the average age was 31.7 years old. In addition, approximately 45.5% 
of the sample offenders were in their 20s at time of their arrest (45.5%, n= 80). 
Approximately 45.6% of the sample were U.S.-born offenders and an additional 
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34.4% were naturalized. These demographic characteristics support the previous 
findings of Kurzman et al., (2011).    
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Table 3. 3 
Description of Demographic Characteristics 
Variable Valid Percent (n) % Missing 
Male  95.9 0.0 
Citizenship (182) 6.2 
U.S. Born 45.6  
Naturalized 32.4  
Legal Permanent Resident 15.4  
Visa Holder .5  
Undocumented  6.0  
Education (94) 51.5 
Less than High School 17.0  
Completed High School  12.8  
Technical School, non-college 2.1  
Some college 45.7  
Completed college  8.5  
Some graduate school 3.2  
Completed graduate school 4.3  
Some Doctorate/Completed  
Doctorate 
6.4  
Occupation (131) 32.5 
Professional 21.4  
Semi-Skilled 32.8  
Unskilled 45.8  
Reported Marital Status (189) 2.6 
Married 39.2  
Unmarried/Single/Divorced 60.8  
Reported Did Have Children 34.0  (188) 3.1 
Note. The total sample includes 194 individuals. In all dichotomous variables,  
only the yes values are reported.  
 
 
The ethnic affiliation of the sample was diverse: Pakistani (13.3%, n = 22), 
African American (12.1%, n = 20), and Caucasian (9.7%, n= 16). The education 
level among the sample varied widely from high school dropouts to doctorates. 
The occupation status among the sample also varied from unskilled laborers to 
professional sector careers. This variation in education and occupation echoes 
previous findings. For example, in his study, Kurzman (2013) did not find a 
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common level of education and occupation among the individuals. In regards to 
occupational status, they ranged from working class individuals to unemployed 
individuals.   
Social Characteristics 
 Table 3.4 indicates the description of the social characteristics that were 
collected. Only two religious affiliations appeared for the offenders in the data 
set. Those were Muslim (64.3 %) and Jewish (0.8%). The majority of the 
offenders did not have prior military experience or training. Less than 10 percent 
of the sample was reported to be suffering from a mental illness. Reported 
radicalization resulted in a significant variable in which almost all offenders had 
been radicalized through one or more avenues of radicalization. 
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Table 3.4 
Description of Reported Social Characteristics 
Variable Valid Percent (n) % Missing  
Religious Affiliation 
 (126) 35.1 
Muslim 64.3  
Jewish 0.8  
n/a 34.9  
Former Military Experience/training 7.7 (194) 0.0 
No. of Diagnosed Mental Illnesses 
 (193) 0.5 
None 91.2  
1 6.7  
2 1.6  
3 0.5  
Radicalization via: 
  
Internet 30.6 (193) 0.5 
Social Networking 15.0 (193) 0.5 
Extremist Propaganda 26.4 (193) 0.5 
Email/ Direct Communication  13.0 (193) 0.5 
Overseas Terrorist Training 15.0 (193) 0.5 
Note. The total sample includes 194 individuals. In all dichotomous variables, only the yes  
values are being reported in the table above.  
  
 
Strain Variables 
 Offenders in general, experienced few reported negative experiences or life 
events involving strain. It must be noted, as discussed as a limitation, that this 
variable was difficult to record since it was uncommon for news reports and court 
documents to discuss the offender’s life experiences of strain. Table 3.5 indicates 
that were more occurrences of a presence of negative stimuli than the other two 
types of strain.  
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Table 3.5 
Description of Strain Variables 
 
Variable Valid Percent (n) % Missing 
Failure to achieve positive valued goals (193) 0.5 
No occurrences 97.9  
1 event 1.6  
2 events .5  
Loss of positive valued stimuli (193) 0.5 
No occurrences 99.5  
Presence of negative stimuli (192) 1.0 
No occurrences 80.7  
1 event 12.0  
2 events 5.7  
3 events 1.0  
5 events .5  
Note. The total sample includes 194 individuals.  
 
 
 
Behavioral Characteristics 
Table 3.6 provides a description of the behavioral characteristics collected 
in this study. The terrorists being examined were mostly first time offenders, with 
no prior convictions. There were more offenders that committed their terrorist 
attacks or plotted with other individuals rather than acting alone. Interestingly, 
many offenders traveled overseas (44.0 %) in furtherance of their crime. It was 
found that offenders used either one type of instrumentality (handgun, personnel 
to fight jihad, etc.) or a combination of these mechanisms in their terrorist 
operations. Often, money was collected and individuals were recruited to support 
terrorist organizations. Lastly, a majority of offenders were, in fact, converts to 
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Islam (63.5 %). This provides partial support to Thachuk et al.’s (2008) third 
category of terrorists, which are third generation converts to Islam. 
 
 
Table 3.6 
Description of Behavioral Characteristics 
 
Variable Valid Percent (n) % Missing 
Reported Prior Criminal 
History 
13.3 (188) 3.1 
Offender Type (193) 0.0 
Alone 35.2  
Group 64.8  
Role of Offender (147) 24.2 
Leader 8.8  
Non-leader 46.9  
n/a 42.9  
Imam 3.1 (194) 0.0 
International Travel 44.0 (193) .5 
Instrumentality (190) 2.1 
Weapons 10.0  
General Supplies 5.8  
Explosives 19.5  
Safe houses and Support 5.8  
Monetary Funding 14.2  
Self as personnel for jihad 27.4  
Multiple 17.4  
Convert to Islam/Muslim 63.5 (126) 35.1 
Prior Religion (Before 
converting to Islam) 
(194)  
n/a 82.3  
Catholic 10.4  
Christian 2.1  
Episcopalian 2.1  
Muslim 1.0  
Christian/Catholic 1.0  
Buddhism  1.0  
Note. The total sample includes 194 individuals. In all dichotomous variables, only the yes  
values are being reported in the table above.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESULTS 
 
This chapter reports the findings of the study. The discussion begins with 
a description of the significant bivariate correlations. The chapter also presents 
the key findings of the two-step cluster analyses evaluated against three 
variables: terrorist affiliation, type of offense, and event type. Four separate 
groups of offenders were identified through each cluster analysis; this was 
reducible to three characteristically unique sets of offenders based on the 
evaluation variables—Cyber Attackers, Convert Affiliates, and Trained Allies. 
Finally, the chapter considers whether these results offer support or refute the 
study hypotheses.  
 
Results of Bivariate Correlations 
First, before conducting the cluster analysis, bivariate coefficient 
correlations were examined among all of the variables (33), excluding immigrant 
generation since this information was missing for too many of the offenders of the 
study. Bivariate correlations were examined for three case details with each of 
the other three variable categories—demographic, social (including strain), and 
behavioral characteristics—separately.  
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Case Details and Demographic Characteristics 
Table 4.1 provides the Spearman’s rho correlation coefficients among 
three case detail variables and six personal demographic variables. Four notable 
correlations were found. First, there was an inverse correlation between reported 
marital status and type of offense variables (rs (189) = -.151, p < .05). This 
significant finding suggests that married offenders were less likely to be involved 
in a successful terrorist attack, therefore more likely to be involved in plots or 
providing material support to terrorist organizations. Second, there was a positive 
significant correlation between occupation and type of offense variables (rs (131) 
= .193, p < .05). This suggests that offenders employed or associated with an 
unskilled occupation level were more likely to be involved in a more successful 
attack.  
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Table 4.1 
Nonparametric Inter-item Correlation Coefficients for Demographic 
Characteristics 
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Type of 
Offense 1.000 
 
2. Number of Co-
Conspirators -.023 1.000 
3. Offender Type -.065 .775** 1.000 
4. Citizenship .060 -.027 .004 1.000 
5. Gender .102 .066 .010 .038 1.000 
6. Reported 
children  -.076 -.030 -.017 -.061 -.061 1.000 
7. Education -.188 -.098 -.203 .030 -.084 1.000 
 
8. Reported 
Marital Status -.151* .063 -.005 -.020 -.047 .615** .019 1.000 
9. Occupation .193* -.052 .025 -.021 -.089 -.203* -.499** -.225* 1.000 
Note. *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). **. Correlation is 
significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).         
  
   
The third substantive finding was an inverse correlation between 
occupation and having children (rs (128) = -.203, p < .05). Those who were 
reported to have children tended to have a lower professional status associated 
with an unskilled occupation. The fourth substantive pattern was a positive 
significant correlation between occupation and education variables (rs (70) = -
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.499, p < .01). Offenders with a lower professional status associated with an 
unskilled occupation.  
It is also worth mentioning that the positive correlation between offender 
type and number of co-conspirators involved was of sufficient strength to suggest 
that only one of these variables needed to be included in the cluster analysis (rs 
(192) = .775, p < .01). It is likely that the two variables are actually capturing the 
same information. Those offenders that acted in a group were likely to have a 
larger number of co-conspirators involved in the terrorist plot or attack. 
Case Details and Social Characteristics 
Table 4.2 provides the Spearman’s rho correlation coefficients among 
three case detail variables and seven social characteristics variables. Many 
notable correlations were found. First, there was a positive significant correlation 
between reported mental illness and type of offense variables (rs (193) = .204, p 
< .01). This suggests that offenders that were reported to be suffering or 
diagnosed with some kind of mental illness were more likely to be involved in a 
more successful terrorist attack. Second, there was an inverse correlation 
between reported mental illness and number of co-conspirators variables (rs 
(191) = -.144, p < .05). This significant finding suggests that offenders that were 
reported to be suffering or diagnosed with some kind of mental illness were more 
likely to have fewer co-conspirators involved in their plot or attack.  
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Table 4.2 
Nonparametric Inter-item Correlation Coefficients for Social Characteristics  
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
  
        
1. Type of Offense 1.000                   
2. Number of Co-
Conspirators 
-.023 1.000                 
3. Offender Type -.065 .775** 1.000 -.069               
4. Reported 
Military History 
.025 .016 -.069 1.000             
5. Reported 
Mental Illness 
.204** -.144* -.016 .110 1.000           
6. Radicalization 
via the Internet  
.019 -.066 .014 .059 .039 1.000         
7. Radicalization 
via social 
networking 
.048 -.027 .004 .040 .079 .602** 1.000       
8. Radicalization 
via extremist 
propaganda 
.042 .020 .020 .045 .031 .648** .570**
 
1.000     
9. Radicalization 
via direct 
communication  
-.019 .021 .024 -.054 -.062 -.089 -.119 -.056 1.000   
10.Radicalization 
via overseas 
terrorist training 
-.108 .265** .156* .040 -.127 -.122 -.136 -.088 .356**
 
1.000 
Note. **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is 
significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
Attending overseas jihadist training camps was also correlated with a 
couple of case details. The third substantive finding was a positive significant 
correlation between radicalization via overseas training and number of co-
conspirators variables (rs (191) = .265, p < .01). Offenders that were radicalized 
overseas in terrorist training camps were more likely to have acted with more co-
conspirators in their terrorist offense. A fourth substantive pattern was a positive 
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significant correlation between radicalization via overseas training and offender 
type variables (rs (192) = .156, p < .05). Offenders that were radicalized overseas 
in terrorist training camps were more likely to have acted in a group versus alone. 
Finally, several important correlations emerged regarding Internet 
radicalization channels. There was a positive significant correlation between 
radicalization via social networking and radicalization via the Internet variables (rs 
(193) = .602, p < .01). Offenders who were radicalized through social networking 
sites also used the Internet as a means of radicalization. Also, a positive 
significant correlation exists between radicalization via extremist propaganda and 
radicalization via the Internet variables (rs (193) = .648, p < .01). Offenders who 
were radicalized through extremist propaganda material were also likely to be 
radicalized through the use of the Internet. 
Radicalization via extremist propaganda and radicalization via social 
networking variables were also significantly related (rs (193) = .570, p < .01). 
Offenders who were radicalized through extremist propaganda material were 
also likely to be radicalized through the use of social networking sites. And, 
offenders who reportedly were radicalized via overseas training were more likely 
to have direct communication with terrorist officials (rs (193) = .356, p < .01). 
Offenders who were radicalized through attending overseas terrorist affiliated 
training camps were also likely to be radicalized through communication, either 
direct or via email with terrorist officials.     
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Case Details and Strain Variables 
Table 4.3 provides the Spearman rho correlation coefficients among three case 
detail variables and three strain variables. Two notable correlations were found. 
First, there was a positive significant correlation between the presence of 
negative stimuli and type of offense variables (rs (192) = .315, p < .01). Offenders 
who experienced negative stimuli (strain) in his or her life were less likely to be 
involved in a successful terrorist plot or attack. There was also a positive 
significant correlation between the failure to achieve positive stimuli and 
presence of negative stimuli variables (rs (192) = .234, p < .01).  Offenders who 
were unable to achieve positive stimuli, such as autonomy were also likely to 
experience negative stimuli in his or her life, such as parents getting divorced or 
the death of a family member. 
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Table 4.3 
Nonparametric Inter-item Correlation Coefficients for Strain Variables 
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Type of Offense 1.000 
2. Number of Co-Conspirators -.023 1.000 
3. Offender Type -.065 .775** 1.000 
4. Failure to achieve positive stimuli  0.370 .028 .004 1.000 
5. Loss of positive stimuli 
6. Presence of negative stimuli .315** .046 .014 .234** 1.000 
Note. **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
Case Details and Behavioral Characteristics  
Table 4.4 provides the Spearman rho correlation coefficients among three 
case detail variables and five behavioral characteristics variables. Seven notable 
correlations were found. The first set of findings pertained to type of offense. 
There was a positive significant correlation between the type of offense and 
reported criminal history (rs (188) = .210, p < .01). Offenders involved in a more 
successful terrorist offense were more likely to have a reported criminal history. 
There was also an inverse correlation between type of offense and reported 
international travel (rs (193) = -.193, p < .01). Offenders involved in a more 
successful terrorist offense were less likely to have traveled internationally in 
furtherance of their terrorist offense. 
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Instrumentality, the range of resources and weapons used during the attacks, 
were associated with two case details. There was an inverse correlation between 
type of offense and instrumentality (rs (190) = -.466, p < .01). Offenders involved 
in a more successful terrorist offense were more likely to use conventional 
weapons during their terrorist operation than other mechanisms, such as funding, 
jihad training, or a combination of these. A positive significant correlation was 
observed between number of co-conspirators and instrumentality (rs (188) = .213, 
p < .01). Terrorist offenses in which there were co-conspirators involved were 
more likely to use a greater type of instrumentality, such as jihad training or 
multiple instrumentalities in their offenses.  
 
 
Table 4.4 
Nonparametric Inter-item Correlation Coefficients for Behavioral Characteristics 
Measure 1 2 3     4     5 6 7 8 
1. Type of Offense 1.000               
2. Number of Co-
Conspirators -.023 1.000             
3. Offender Type -.065 .775** 1.000           
4. Reported Imam -.016 -.054 -.055 1.000         
5. Reported Criminal 
History  .210** .044 .003 -.065 1.000       
6. Reported Convert 
to Islam/Muslim .084 -.108 -.080 -.092 .375** 1.000   
7. Instrumentality -.466** .213** .116 .010 -.102 -.112 1.000   
8. Reported 
International Travel  -.193** .184* .060 -.039 -.066 -.096 .298** 1.000 
Note. **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is 
significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).          
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Two other correlations warrant attention. A positive significant correlation 
was observed between number of co-conspirators and reported international 
travel (rs (191) = .184, p < .05). Terrorist offenses in which there were co-
conspirators involved were more likely to have traveled internationally in 
furtherance of their crime. Another substantive pattern was a positive significant 
correlation between reported criminal history and reported convert to Islam (rs 
(125) = .375, p < .01). Offenders with a reported criminal history were also likely 
to be converts to Islam. Lastly, there was a positive significant correlation 
between reported international travel and instrumentality (rs (189) = .298, p < 
.01). Offenders who traveled overseas in furtherance of their crime used more 
advanced instrumentalities or multiple instrumentalities for their planned plot or 
attack.  
 
Results of Cluster Analysis    
Model 1: Clustering by Terrorist Affiliation 
The cluster analysis revealed four clusters of offenders who had similar 
case details, demographic, social, and behavioral characteristics assessed 
against the evaluation variable, terrorist affiliation: 1) Internet Radicals (heavily 
radicalized group of offenders with no terrorist organization affiliation), 2) Deviant 
Associates (Al Qaeda affiliated non-radicalized, group offenders), 3) Trained 
Jihadists (Al Qaeda group offenders who traveled abroad), and 4) Mobile Lone 
Wolves (Al Qaeda, heavily radicalized group offenders). The cluster summary 
64
indicated nine important variables, which generated these clusters. Those 
variables were terrorist affiliation, offender type (alone and group) reported 
international travel, radicalization via the Internet, radicalization via extremist 
propaganda, radicalization via social networking sites, radicalization via email or 
direct communication with terrorist officials, and radicalization via overseas 
training with terrorist organizations. Table 4.5 provides results. To develop a 
more comprehensive description of each cluster, notable demographic 
characteristics are described where distinct patterns appear.     
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Table 4.5 
Two-Step Cluster Illustrating Radicalization Channels Evaluated by Terrorist 
Affiliation  
   Cluster 1: 
Internet 
Radicals 
Cluster 2: 
Deviant 
Associates 
Cluster 3: 
Trained 
Jihadists 
Cluster 4:  
Mobile  
Lone 
Wolves 
Terrorist Affiliation None 
(41.2%) 
Al Qaeda 
(51.0%) 
Al Qaeda 
(50.0%) 
Al Qaeda 
(43.2%) 
Offender Type   
   Alone 
 
23.9 % (16) 
  
0.0 % 
 
  
10.4 % (7) 
  
65.7 % (44) 
  Group  28.5 % (35) 39.8 % (49) 31.7 % (39) 0.0 % 
Radicalization Factors 
  
  
International travel 22.9 %  (19) 0.0 % 55.4 % (46) 21.7 % (18) 
None  29.9 % (32) 45.8 % (49)   0.0 % 24.3 % (26)  
 
Foreign training  3.6 % (1)  0.0 % 96.4 % (27)   0.0 
None 30.9 % (50)  30.2 % (49)   11.7 % (19) 27.2 % (44) 
Extremist propaganda  86.0 % (43)   0.0 % 12.0 % (6)  2.0 % (1) 
None   5.7 % (8) 
 
 35.0 % (49) 28.6 % (40)  30.7 % (43) 
Internet materials  83.1 % (49) 0.0 % 6.8 % (4) 10.2 % (6) 
None 1.5 % (2) 37.4 % (49) 32.1 % (42) 29.0 % (38) 
Social networking sites 96.6 % (28) 0.0 %  0.0 % 3.4 % (1) 
None 14.3 % (23) 30.4 % (49) 28.6% (46) 26.7% (43) 
Direct communication 16.0 % (4) 24.0 % (6) 60.0 % (15) 0.0 % 
None 28.5 % (47) 26.1 % (43) 18.8 % (31) 26.7 % (44) 
Note. The bolded figures represent important results. N is reported in 
parentheses.  
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Cluster 1 represents a group of Internet radicalized defendants as apt to 
work in a group or alone without any affiliation to terrorist organizations. These 
individuals had no discernable, direct links to recognized terrorist organizations. 
However, they were radicalized through extremist material and social networking 
mechanisms available through the Internet. Extremist propaganda, online 
resources, and social networking sites may materially contribute in two manners 
to their criminal behavior: these materials foster their radicalization, and through 
accessing these sources, individuals may find co-conspirators to carry out their 
attacks. On average these defendants committed their offense in a group of 3.1 
offenders, with an average of 2.2 U.S.-based co-conspirators. This suggests that 
in reaching out to others, individuals often encounter foreign-based operatives.  
Although this group of defendants had no direct links to terrorist 
organizations, the majority (68.6%) provided material support to a terrorist 
organization. This can be due to the fact that the majority were U.S. born citizens 
that did not travel overseas. There were three prominent ethnicities that stood out 
in the cluster, Pakistani (17.0%), Jordanian (10.0%), and Caucasian (10.0%). 
Interestingly; these defendants were mostly Muslim (69.8%), single (66.0%), and 
had some college education (65.5%). Lastly, the defendants grouped into Cluster 
1 ranged in age from 17 to 45 although there were more offenders in their 20s at 
their time of arrest and held unskilled occupations.   
Cluster 2 represents a group of non-radicalized Al Qaeda affiliated 
defendants as apt to work in a group as alone. Even though these offenders had 
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direct links with Al Qaeda, there was an absence of radicalization, contrary to 
Cluster 1. This suggests that this group of defendants was influenced through 
other means. On average, these defendants committed their offense in a group 
of 4.7 offenders, with an average of 3.4 U.S.-based co-conspirators. 
Cluster 2 defendants were involved in material support to terrorist 
organizations (57.1%) and plots to attack the United States (42.9%). This cluster 
consisted of African American (12.5%) converts to Islam (64.0%), who were 
single (73.3%) and had some college education (42.9%). This cluster had the 
most females (5 out of the 8 of the entire data sample) of all the clusters. 
Additionally, the cluster was represented by 49.0% U.S. born citizens, many of 
whom held unskilled occupations (43.8%).  
Cluster 3 represents a group of radicalized and Al Qaeda affiliated 
defendants who were as apt to work in a group as alone and traveled abroad in 
furtherance of their crime. Similar to Cluster 2, these offenders had direct links to 
Al Qaeda officials and members. This group of defendants was radicalized 
through terrorist training camps and direct communication with terrorist officials 
by means of international travel. On average, these defendants committed their 
offense in a group of 6.1 offenders, with an average of 5.1 U.S.-based co-
conspirators. This suggests that despite overseas travel for operational support 
and training, defendants maintained their relationships with U.S.-based 
individuals in order to carry out their terrorist offenses.   
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In general, the individuals in this cluster were younger than observed in 
other clusters (e.g., 14.0% were 25 years old at the time of the crime). A large 
portion of the defendants were of Yemeni (16.3%) or Pakistani (11.6%) descent. 
Cluster 3 included many offenders who were U.S. born citizens (44.2%). 
Contrary to the previous two clusters, there was a variety in the type of 
instrumentality these defendants used and planned to use, explosives (17.8%), 
jihad training (44.4%), and a combination of various weapons and devices 
(24.4%). The majority of the offenders were born into a Muslim family (80.6%) 
and most were married with children (83.9%).  
Cluster 4 represents a group of heavily radicalized defendants who 
primarily acted alone in their terrorist offenses. These individuals had direct links 
to Al Qaeda, although little information was available regarding how they were 
recruited into jihad: prior direct contact with Al Qaeda operatives and Internet-
based indoctrination were absent. However, these offenders managed to travel 
overseas for operational support from Al Qaeda members and officials. This 
cluster had the most highly educated defendants with 21.1% with some college 
and another 21.1% with or in pursuit of a Ph.D. degree. However, there were 
more unmarried than married offenders. Like the other clusters in this analysis, 
there was a predominance of Pakistani (14.6%) and Caucasian (14.6%) 
offenders versus other ethnic affiliations.   
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Model 2: Clustering by Type of Offense 
This cluster analysis tested whether defendants could be grouped by 
offense type, meaning that unique characteristics may be visible among those 
choosing to provide material support to terrorist activity compared with individuals 
who engage in or attempt a direct attack against a U.S. target. The cluster 
analysis indicated four types of offender types according to the evaluation 
variable, type of offense: 1) Semi-Skilled Radicals (unmarried radicalized 
offenders), 2) Deviant Converts (unmarried, non-radicalized offenders), 3) 
Professional Trainees (married offenders with children who received terrorist 
training), and 4) Web-Based Radicals (married offenders, radicalized through 
electronic media).  
Clusters were defined by eight variables:  type of offense, reported marital 
status, reported children, reported international travel, radicalization via the 
Internet, radicalization via extremist propaganda, radicalization via social 
networking sites, and radicalization via overseas training with terrorist 
organizations. However, it should be noted that the evaluation variable, type of 
offense, was not correlated with cluster composition. In other words, all clusters 
indicated group of defendants involved in only material support to terrorist 
organizations. Unique clusters were not found for groups of defendants involved 
in plots, attempted attacks, and successful terrorist attacks. Table 4.6 provides 
results.  
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 Table 4.6 
Two-Step Cluster Illustrating Radicalization Channels Evaluated by Type of 
Offense   
   Cluster 1: 
Semi-
Skilled 
Radicals 
Cluster 2: 
Deviant 
Converts 
Cluster 3: 
Professional 
Trainees 
Cluster 4: 
Web-Based 
Radicals 
Type of Offense 
Material Support to 
Terrorism 
 
66.7 % 
 
45.8 % 
 
70.7 % 
 
75.0 % 
Marital/Children 
 
Married 
 
 
22.1 % (15) 
 
 
0.0 % 
 
 
60.3 % (41) 
 
 
17.6 % (12) 
Unmarried 30.3 % (33) 44.0 % (48) 0.0 % 25.7 % (28) 
Children 19.4 % (12) 12.9 % (8) 64.5 % (40) 3.2 % (2) 
No children 31.3 % (36) 34.8 % (40) 0.9 % (1) 33.0 % (38) 
Radicalization Factors 
International travel 
 
21.0 % (17) 
 
3.7 % (3) 
 
25.9 % (21) 
 
49.4 % (40) 
None  32.3 % (31) 46.9 % (45) 20.8 % (20) 0.0 % 
Foreign training  3.6 % (1) 0.0 % 35.7 % (10) 60.7 % (17) 
None 31.5 % (47) 32.2 % (48) 20.8 % (31) 15.4 % (23) 
Extremist propaganda  85.7 % (42) 0.0 % 2.0 % (1) 12.2 % (6) 
None  4.7 % (6) 37.5 % (48) 31.3 % (40) 26.6 % (34) 
Internet materials  82.1 % (46) 0.0 % 3.6 % (2) 14.3 % (8) 
None 1.7 % (2) 39.7 % (48) 32.2 % (39) 26.4 % (32) 
Social networking sites 96.2 % (25) 3.8 % (1) 0.0 % 0.0 % 
None 15.2 % (23) 31.1 % (47) 27.2 % (41) 26.5 % (40) 
Note. The bolded figures represent important results. N is reported in 
parentheses.  
 
 
Cluster 1 represents a group of unmarried radicalized offenders. These 
individuals were radicalized through propaganda materials and social networking 
mechanisms available through the Internet. These same offenders traveled 
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overseas in furtherance of their crime. This group included terrorist incidents with 
an average of 3.0 participants and with an average of 2.0 U.S.-based co-
conspirators.  
This group of offenders with a non-Al Qaeda terrorist affiliation was mostly 
Pakistani (16.2%), Jordanian (10.8%), and Caucasian (10.8). Most were Muslim 
(68.3%) and U.S. born citizens (53.2%). This cluster was represented by semi-
skilled offenders with some college education (63.0%). 
Cluster 2 represents a group of unmarried, non-radicalized defendants. 
These defendants were not radicalized through any of the radicalization means 
collected. Nor did these defendants travel overseas; rather they were influenced 
within the United States. This group of offenders was almost equally both 
material supporters to terrorist organizations and plotters of terrorist attacks (45.8 
% and 43.8%, respectively).  
This group included terrorist incidents with an average of 3.4 offenders 
and with an average of 2.1 U.S.-based co-conspirators. Additionally, these 
supporters and plotters had no terrorist affiliation and many were U.S. born 
citizens (50.0%) A large portion were African American (30.0%) and most were 
either Muslim (44.0%) or converts (53.8%). Cluster 2 had 38.0% offenders with 
some college education and an unskilled occupational status. 
Cluster 3 represents a group of married defendants with children. Many of 
these defendants received overseas terrorist training. The overseas terrorist 
training was the major influencing factor for this group of defendants. This group 
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included terrorist incidents with an average of 3.8 offenders, with an average of 
2.8 U.S.-based co-conspirators, and .3 non-U.S.-based co-conspirators. Cluster 
3 represented offenders with a non-Al Qaeda affiliation, who were mostly U.S. 
born citizens (45.9%), Caucasian (15.4%) and Pakistani (17.9%), and of Muslim 
affiliation (63.0%). Lastly, a large portion of these offenders held professional 
careers (41.2%) and had a college education (42.9%).  
 Cluster 4 represents non-radicalized married defendants. Rather than 
being radicalized through modern telecommunication channels, these defendants 
traveled overseas to attain support for their terrorist activity. This group included 
terrorist incidents in which the number of offenders involved on average was 4.7 
offenders, with an average of 3.6 U.S.-based co-conspirators, and .5 non-U.S.-
based co-conspirators. Offenders in this group were either Al Qaeda (52.5%) or 
non-Al Qaeda (47.5%) affiliated terrorists. Offenders were also primarily split 
between U.S. born (41.7%) and naturalized citizens (41.7%); although, most 
were Muslim affiliated (70.8%). A portion of those offenders were of Pakistani 
(13.2%) descent.  
Model 3: Revised Offense Type 
A final cluster analysis was performed to deal with a problem revealed in 
the second cluster analysis: the evaluation variable, type of offense was 
ineffective due to skewed frequency distribution. The problem was that there 
were too few cases of plotting, attempts, and completed attacks for the modeling 
process to uncover stable results. In the new variable, events involving a plot, 
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attempted, or successful attack were consolidated to compare against incidents 
where individuals only provided material support to terrorist organizations. Thus, 
the revised evaluation variable was coded: 1 = material support to terrorism and 
0 = other.  
This analysis revealed four clusters of terrorist offenders who had similar 
case details, demographic, social, and behavioral characteristics. Using event 
type as a confirmatory variable revealed four clusters: 1) Unmarried Attack 
Oriented Offenders, 2) Married Supporters, 3) Unmarried Plotters and Attackers, 
and 4) Unmarried Non-Radical Plotters and Attackers. The cluster summary 
indicated eight important variables: event type, reported marital status, reported 
children, reported international travel, radicalization via the Internet, radicalization 
via extremist propaganda, radicalization via social networking sites, and 
radicalization via overseas training with terrorist organizations. Table 4.7 
provides results. 
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Table 4.7 
Two-Step Cluster Illustrating Radicalization Channels Evaluated by Event Type   
   Cluster 1 
Unmarried 
Attack 
Oriented 
Offenders 
Cluster 2 
Married 
Supporters 
Cluster 3 
Unmarried 
Plotters and 
Attackers  
Cluster 4 
Unmarried 
Non-Radical 
Plotters and 
Attackers 
Event Type 
 
 
Marital/ Children 
Married 
Other, 66.7%  
 
 
 
22.1 % (15) 
Material 
Support, 54.2% 
 
 
60.3 % (41) 
Other, 70.0%  
 
 
 
17.6 % (12) 
Other, 75.0% 
 
 
 
0.0 % (12) 
Unmarried 30.3 % (33) 0.0 %  25.7 % (28) 44.0 % (48) 
Reported Child 19.4 % (12) 64.5 % (40) 3.2 % (2) 12.9 % (8) 
No children 31.3 % (36) 0.9 % (1) 33.0 % (38) 34.8 % (40) 
Radicalization Factors 
International Travel 
 
21.0 % (17) 
 
25.9 % (21) 
 
49.4 % (40) 
 
3.7 % (3) 
None  32.3 % (31) 20.8 % (20) 0.0 % 46.9 % (45) 
Foreign training  3.6 % (1) 35.7 % (10) 60.7 % (17) 0.0 % 
None 31.5 % (47) 20.8 % (31) 15.4 % (23) 32.2 % (48) 
Extremist propaganda  85.7 % (42) 2.0 % (1) 12.2 % (6) 0.0 % 
None  4.7 % (6) 31.3 % (40) 26.6 % (34) 37.5 % (48) 
Internet 82.1 % (46) 3.6 % (2) 14.3 % (8) 0.0 % 
None 1.7 % (2) 32.2 % (39) 26.4 % (32) 39.7 % (48) 
Social networking sites  96.2 % (25) 0.0 % 0.0 % 3.8 % 
None 15.2 % (23) 27.2 % (41) 26.5 % (40) 31.1 % (47) 
Note. The bolded figures represent important results. N is reported in 
parentheses.  
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Cluster 1 represents a group of unmarried defendants who plotted, 
attacked, or attempted to attack (66.7%) against the United States. These 
defendants were radicalized through materials and social networking 
mechanisms available through the Internet. Due to the absence of international 
travel and not having any direct communication with terrorist officials, offenders 
in this cluster had a non-Al Qaeda terrorist group affiliation. These terrorist 
incidents involved on average of 3.0 offenders, with an average of 2.0 U.S.-
based co-conspirators. 
This group of offenders was characterized by U.S. born citizenship 
(53.2%); Pakistani (16.2%), Caucasian (10.8%), and Jordanian (10.8%) ethnic 
affiliation, Muslim affiliation (68.3%), some college education (63.0%), and 
unskilled occupation (48.4%).   
Cluster 2 represents married offenders who provided some kind of 
material support to terrorist organizations. These offenders were not radicalized 
by any of ethnic/Internet-based means examined; however, they traveled 
overseas in support of their terrorist activity. These terrorist incidents involved an 
average of 3.8 offenders, with an average of 2.8 U.S.-based co-conspirators. In 
addition, this cluster indicated that these offenders were U.S. born citizens 
(45.9%), held some college education (42.9%), and held a professional career 
(41.2%). Many of these offenders were not Al Qaeda affiliated (51.2%). Most of 
the defendants in this cluster were Muslim (63.0%). The prominent ethnicity was 
Pakistani (17.9%). 
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Cluster 3 represents unmarried travelers who mostly plotted, attempted to 
attacks, and attacked against the United States. These defendants were not 
radicalized through any of the radicalization means examined; instead they 
traveled overseas to seek support and guidance for their terrorist activity. These 
terrorist incidents involved an average of 4.7 offenders, with an average of 3.6 
U.S.-based co-conspirators. Cluster 3 individuals were both affiliated with Al 
Qaeda (52.5%) and non-Al Qaeda (47.5%) terrorist organizations. Interestingly, 
this cluster included the same number of U.S born and naturalized citizens 
(41.7% for each type). The offenders included in this group held some college 
education (40.7%) and had an unskilled occupation (65.4%).  
  Cluster 4 represents unmarried offenders who mostly plotted against the 
United States or were involved in an attempted or unsuccessful attack against 
the United States. Similar to Cluster 3, these defendants were not radicalized 
and did not travel overseas for terrorist activity support. Instead, these 
defendants sought support and guidance domestically. This group included 
terrorist incidents in which the number of offenders involved on average was 3.4 
offenders, with an average of 2.1 U.S.-based co-conspirators. The terrorist 
affiliation for this group of offenders varied across Al Qaeda, non-Al Qaeda, and 
none; none of them were overrepresented in the group. Again, many of the 
offenders in this cluster were U.S. born citizens (50.0%). The largest ethnic group 
was African American (30.0%), and many defendants in this cluster were 
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converts to Islam (53.8%). This group of offenders’ educational level ranged from 
some high school to completion of advanced degrees, such as a M.A. or Ph.D. 
 Model 1 and Model 3 Cluster Assignment Comparisons 
A cross-tabulation (cross-tabs) analysis was performed for the cluster 
assignments that resulted from Model 3 and those of Model 1. Interestingly, it 
was found that those terrorist offenders of Cluster 1 are the same offenders for 
Model 1 and 3.These 46 offenders represent 26% of the total sample, creating a 
distinct group of offenders. 
Unmarried and with some college education, this group of individuals are 
heavily influenced by radicalization materials available through the Internet social 
networking sites. While less apt to carry out successful attacks, their willingness 
to provide material support or to attempt attacks without having direct affiliations 
with terrorist groups makes them particularly dangerous. Their electronic footprint 
is the only way to identify and track these individuals. 
Although not as distinguishable as the group of offenders described 
above, a second group of offenders was found, which were the unmarried non-
radical mix of plotters and supporters of Model 3 and the deviant associates of 
Model 1. These plotters and supporters of terrorism represented 18% of the total 
sample. This group of offenders were U.S. citizens, unmarried, mostly converts 
to Islam, and had a high level of education. Lastly, the trained jihadists and 
mobile lone wolves were dispersed among all cluster of Model 3. Nonetheless, 
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the clusters shared offense and offender characteristics, including overseas 
travel, terrorist training, and terrorist affiliation. Table 4.8 provides results. 
 
  
79
Table 4.8  
Comparison of Model 1 and Model 3 Cluster Assignments 
Model 1: 
Terrorist 
Affiliation 
Model 3: Event Type  Row Total 
Cluster 1: 
Unmarried 
Attack 
Oriented 
Offenders 
Cluster 2:  
Married 
Supporters 
Cluster 3: 
Unmarried 
Plotters and 
Attackers 
Cluster 4: 
Unmarried Non-
Radical Plotters 
and Attackers 
 
Cluster 1: 
Internet 
Radicals 
46 people 
(26% of 
sample) 
 
Unique 
Characteristics 
• Unmarried 
• U.S. citizens 
• Some 
college 
education 
0 (0%) 
 
 
2 people 
(1% of sample) 
 
Unique 
Characteristics 
• Involved in 
plots  
• Unmarried  
• No children 
• Int. travel 
• Foreign 
training 
 
0 (0%) 48 people 
 
Joint 
characteristics 
• No terrorist 
affiliation 
• Radicalization 
via 
propaganda, 
internet, 
social 
networking 
sites 
•  Material 
supporters 
Cluster 2: 
Deviant 
Associates 
0 (0%) 10 people 
(6% of sample) 
 
Unique 
Characteristics 
• Married with 
children 
• Int. travel 
• Foreign 
training 
• Muslim 
affiliated 
0 (0%) 31 people 
(18% of sample) 
 
Unique 
Characteristics 
• Involved in 
plots 
• Converts 
• Unmarried 
• Highly 
educated 
• U.S. citizens 
41 people 
 
Joint 
characteristics 
• Material 
supporters 
• No electronic 
radicalization 
• Al Qaeda 
affiliated 
Cluster 3: 
Trained 
Jihadists 
0 (0%) 
 
17 people 
(10% of sample) 
 
Unique 
Characteristics 
• Married with 
children 
• Direct 
communication 
w/ terrorist 
leaders 
• Muslim 
affiliated 
25 people 
(14% of sample) 
 
Unique 
Characteristics 
• Plots 
• Both U.S. born 
and 
naturalized 
citizens 
• Some college 
• Unskilled 
occupation  
2 people 
(1% of sample) 
 
Unique 
Characteristics 
• Plots 
• U.S. citizens 
• Converts to 
Islam 
• Highly 
educated 
• Unmarried 
44 people 
 
Joint 
characteristics 
• Material 
Supporters 
• Al Qaeda 
affiliated 
• Traveled 
overseas 
• Foreign 
training 
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Cluster 4: 
Mobile 
Lone 
Wolves 
2 people  
(1% of sample) 
 
Unique 
Characteristics 
• Unmarried 
 
14 people 
(8% of sample) 
 
Unique 
Characteristics 
• Material 
Supporters 
• Professional 
career 
• Muslim 
affiliated 
13 people 
(7% of sample) 
 
Unique 
Characteristics 
• Plots and 
Material 
Support 
• Unmarried 
• U.S. born & 
naturalized 
citizens 
• Some college 
• Unskilled 
occupation 
15 people 
(9% of sample) 
 
Unique 
Characteristics 
• Plots and 
Support 
• Sought 
support 
domestically 
• U.S. born 
• Converts to 
Islam 
• Unmarried 
44 people 
 
 
Joint 
characteristics 
• No electronic 
radicalization  
• Al Qaeda 
affiliated 
• Highly 
educated 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DISCUSSION 
 
Overall, this study found some evidence to suggest that homegrown 
terrorists can be parsed into clusters. Moreover, significant relationships were 
found among the case details and offender characteristics. This suggests that 
there are identifiable social and behavioral patterns among terrorist offenders 
that may be the focus of crime prevention efforts. Homegrown terrorists can be 
differentiated, albeit to a limited extent, by radicalization channels and terrorist 
affiliation, as well as type of offense. This chapter presents policy implications 
associated with the clusters of offenders found. They study revealed a typology 
of three groups of offenders ranging from Cyber Attackers to Convert Affiliates, 
and Trained Allies.  
 
Bivariate Correlations Significant Findings 
Demographic Characteristics  
Contrary to what would be expected, the offenders who held a lower 
unskilled occupation were more likely to be involved in a more successful 
terrorist operation. While that may be surprising at first, terrorist attacks are now 
being plotted and acted upon using conventional tools and supplies at the 
disposable of virtually anyone. Therefore, expertise is not needed in the 
manufacture or assembly of special weapons to carry out an act of terrorism. It 
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was also found that offenders suffering or diagnosed with a mental illness were 
more likely to be involved in a plot or attack.  
One of the implications associated with these findings is that mental health 
service providers should be trained to identify potential terrorist threats. A great 
deal of effort has gone into training law enforcement, but mental health providers 
may be in a good position to detect these individuals and prevent future criminal 
behavior. In addition, these offenders were also found to attack alone or with 
fewer co-conspirators than the other non-mentally unstable offenders.  
Community outreach is needed between mental health services, criminal 
justice, and community services, particularly those faith-based programs housed 
within religious institutions. These civilian service providers are better positioned 
to identify vulnerable individuals or convicted offenders (prison-based programs) 
who are at risk for extremist radicalization and are likely to pose a threat to 
themselves and others. In the case of correctional settings, an extremist risk 
assessment tool could be added to intake and screening procedures so that 
vulnerable individuals are not housed with known activists. While this is already 
in place in some institutions, existing assessment tools/protocol could be 
modified to focus on religious affiliation and influence among inmates, particularly 
born again converts to Islam.  
Mosques and other religious organizations can be involved in crime 
prevention efforts. Specifically, leaders of worship settings can be trained to 
identify individuals at risk or those who have a violent interpretation of the religion 
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and therefore pose a threat against the United States. Also, therapy, 
psychological evaluation, and treatment can be provided in order to prevent 
future extremism. There is also the Justice and Mental Health Collaboration 
Program (JMHCP), which identifies those incarcerated and mentally unstable 
offenders and provide mental health treatment and substance abuse programs 
(Justice and Mental Health Collaboration Program, n.d.). This program is thought 
to increase the safety of the public by providing mentally ill offenders with the 
appropriate care they need. The JMHCP also helps in finding alternative 
prosecution methods for those mentally unstable where they can rehabilitate 
through treatment efforts rather than be given a punitive sentence for their 
offense (Justice and Mental Health Collaboration Program, n.d.). It may be 
possible to add an “extremist risk assessment” component to screening 
instruments used during intake. These modified risk assessments can extend the 
existing safety net by existing identifying individuals at-risk for radicalization.     
Due to the possible occurrence of terrorism actions by mentally unstable 
individuals, additional research is needed. This study was not designed to 
examine mental health issues in detail. Future research is needed that is able to 
better evaluate the association between mental health and radicalization among 
homegrown terrorists. In addition, a future study would evaluate isolation issues 
for each of the participants in order to explain why these offenders are more 
likely to act upon with fewer co-conspirators than others.  
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Radicalization Processes and Case Details 
The study findings indicated that terrorist offenders traveled overseas to 
terrorist training camps in furtherance of their crime. Specifically, offenders who 
traveled overseas to training camps were more likely to have more co-
conspirators involved in their terrorist plot or attack. This indicates that generating 
networks with terrorist leaders and other terrorist officials and non-officials has 
not been replaced by the modern technology of the Internet and its various 
sharing of jihadist sources and communication outlets; such as extremist blogs, 
forums, and social media sites like YouTube. However, since there was no 
significant relationship between radicalization via overseas training and 
successful attack, it leads to indicate that the offender’s overseas travel is 
operational support and not necessarily support to undertake the attack.  
As discussed in the literature review, a single path to radicalization does 
not exist nor have we found conclusive evidence of a set of radicalization factors 
that indicate direct ties to terrorist activity. However, this study finds some 
support of the importance of Internet-based resources. It was also discovered 
that radicalization via the Internet, social media sites, extremist propaganda, and 
contact with terrorist officials has not fully replaced the operational support that is 
often attained by traveling overseas and attending training camps. All these 
methods of influence essentially work together in influencing, recruiting, and 
radicalizing individuals to commit acts of terrorism. Specifically, those that were 
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radicalized by the use of the Internet often also used social networking sites and 
extremist propaganda.  
The availability of violent jihadist content and extremist propaganda is only 
one of the quandaries that law enforcement is faced with in attempting to 
intercept web-based violent jihadist content and the removal of online extremism. 
Due to the First Amendment’s freedom of expression, terrorist individuals take 
advantage of American hosting companies to create their jihadist websites, 
forums, YouTube accounts, and other social media. There are many hosting 
companies, like GoDaddy.com and Dynadot.com that allow their customers to 
create a website, such as the RevolutionMuslim.com, without having to disclose 
their true identities by providing “care of” company addresses (Klausen, Barbieri, 
Reichlin-Melnick, & Zelin, 2012).  
Another problem that law enforcement is faced with is that not all content 
can be removed, just because it is jihadist related. The content has to meet the 
imminent threat criteria (which is rarely the case) or violate the web hosts’ terms 
of service (Klausen et al., 2012). Policy allowing law enforcement to interdict or 
shut down jihadist content is needed in order to minimize the number of 
individuals being radicalized online. An alternate solution would be some kind of 
systematic web crawling or Internet bot, within the World Wide Web (the Web) to 
capture who is accessing the extremist propaganda and the various blogs, 
websites, forums, etc. that are linked together and essentially accessed 
simultaneously. This web crawling system would identify specific targets, those 
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that are the most influential or attract the most viewers and this would aid in their 
removal from the Internet.  
For example, there is the specially designed web crawling program that 
was used in a recent study by Kila Joffres and Martin Bouchard (2014) in which 
the researchers examined the effectiveness of different disruption strategies of 
child pornography websites on the Internet. One of its findings indicated hub 
attacks to be the most effective. Hub attacks are defined as targeting main 
websites with many links to other sites. Hub attacks were found to be effective in 
disrupting the network since this removes links between websites, therefore 
reducing the amount of available material and making it harder to find (Joffres & 
Bouchard, in press). Applied to the current study, this would mean targeting 
extremist or terrorist related websites that have a large array of links to other 
extremist or terrorist material on the Internet.   
Systematically disabling critical websites could be an effective crime 
prevention strategy. It would serve to increase the effort needed to access 
extremist material, but also protects free speech since it is not invading 
individuals’ access routes, but instead targeting the specific content of the Web in 
its entirety. While the findings do not yield all the avenues used by terrorist 
organizations like Al Qaeda, it can be stated that Al Qaeda attempts to radicalize 
and recruit via the Internet, extremist propaganda, overseas training, and direct 
communication is successful.  
87
In addition to interdiction efforts by law enforcement via the Internet, in 
August 2011, the Obama Administration signed the National Strategy for 
Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States 
(National Strategy for Empowering Local Partners) in order to combat terrorism in 
the homeland through community based approach (Bjelopera, 2014).  While the 
National Strategy for Empowering Locals Partners has its strict goals and 
responsibilities in mind, it does not dictate exactly how these efforts will be 
administered. For example, the narrative discusses partnerships between law 
enforcement agencies and community leaders in order to provide information on 
the threat of homegrown extremism, but it does not give direction as to how 
those partnerships will be established. In addition, those partnerships will serve 
as the community’s eyes to detect and prevent radicalization to violence. Ideally, 
this policy would meet with community leaders to provide information and training 
on detecting, reporting, and ultimately preventing radicalization of individuals that 
may lead to terrorist attacks against the United States.  
Moreover, a prevention and intervention program like the National 
Strategy for Empowering Local Partners can be promising. But for a program to 
be effective, trust has to be built between law enforcement agencies and 
community leaders. Additionally, community leaders have to be trained and 
informed on the concept of radicalization and guidance to drive detection of such 
threatening individuals. Without proper training and relationship building, the 
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community will be reluctant or fearful of contacting law enforcement for help, 
guidance, or offer information.  
 Future research is needed to examine the quantity of the available jihadist 
content on the Internet and its access traffic by individuals, prior offenders and 
non-offenders. The examination of this data will yield to more rigorous regulation 
of the material viewed by individuals on the Internet and at what point that access 
will be prohibited or blocked. As already mentioned above, web crawling can be 
a useful tool for law enforcement and therefore another avenue of research for 
scholars. Scholars would be able to view the quantitative success that web 
crawling has on accessibility of extremist material by offenders.  
 Strain 
The findings of the study supported Agnew’s (1992) general strain theory. 
However, it should be noted that the researcher did not collect information on the 
specific motivation to commit the terrorist plot or attack. The findings indicated 
that those offenders who experienced negative stimuli (negative events or 
situations) in his or her life were less likely to be involved in a successful terrorist 
attack. Those offenders who experienced negative events or situations were also 
likely to not be able to achieve their goals in life, such as financial stability, 
respect, or autonomy. These results can also yield indication that those who are 
not successful or happy in their life achievements are less of a risk than others; 
such as radicalized individuals or mentally unstable individuals. While it can be 
stated that there is an indication of experiencing negative events in the offender’s 
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life and criminal behavior, it is uncertain whether the offender chose to commit a 
crime out of revenge or prevention as theorized by Agnew (1992).   
Behavioral Characteristics 
It was found that those offenders involved in a more successful plot or 
attack had a prior criminal record, in which they were prosecuted. Furthermore, 
those that had a criminal history were likely to be converts to Islam. The data 
collected indicated instances of offenders who converted to Islam by their own 
will or through the influence of others. As discussed in the discussion of 
radicalized individuals, greater links between non-radicalized mosques and 
prisons are necessary in order to prevent the dissemination of unstable or violent 
interpretations of Islam.   
Due to the fact that offenders with a prior criminal history are likely to 
engage in a successful plot or attack indicates more stringent probation terms 
and agreements may be needed. Specifically, monitoring or prohibiting Internet 
activity may be a condition of release. Furthermore, since those with a criminal 
record are also likely to be converts to Islam, religious privileges in prison should 
be regulated more closely. Currently, the First Amendment is a major protective 
barrier for prison inmates and the specific material they can receive and mail out, 
specifically extremist or propaganda material.  
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) reports that prison officials are 
allowed to withhold some material, on a case-by-case basis, mainly determined 
by prison safety. If a magazine article or set of articles is a threat to the safety of 
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the prison environment, the facility is allowed to remove only that unsafe material 
(American Civil Liberties Union, 2010). However, when it comes to outgoing mail, 
inmates can reach out to extremist groups freely without disruption from prison 
officials. Again, prison officials can only intervene, if that outgoing 
correspondence discusses escape plans, threats, running an illegal business, 
and blackmail. However, this list can be extended to include extremist 
radicalization, specifically violent jihadist ideology. 
In addition, the activity within mosques may also need more vigilant 
surveillance. Since offenders who had a criminal record were also converts to 
Islam, religious leaders with access to convicted individuals require careful 
examination. Regular, intensive screenings and background checks should be 
conducted on all religious leaders and Imams authorized to regularly visit 
inmates in prison. Prison officials can create a trusted list of allowed religious 
leaders instead of allowing anyone into prison visitation sessions.  
Future research should examine the various types of offenses by 
homegrown offenders in order to identify any significant patterns in prior 
convictions that may act as a precursor or transitioning behavior prior to 
committing or planning to commit an act of terrorism. This type of identification 
would again be useful among community leaders, religious leaders, and law 
enforcement. Community leaders and mosque leaders serve as the primary eyes 
of law enforcement in providing investigative leads and tips. This identification 
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would result from training, trust, and a communal dedication to identifying 
individuals at risk. 
  Additionally, an examination of Muslim inmates who turn towards violent 
behavior when released from prison will widen the known reach of radicalization 
within prison and its effects when released from prison. This goes along the basis 
of a web crawling system for probation officers and task force officers to use on 
released offenders. Again, probation officers would be the primary responders to 
these types of intelligence gathering that would lead to targeting larger networks 
of radicalized individuals.   
 
Cluster Analysis Significant Findings 
The cluster analysis indicated a total of four clusters dependent of a case 
detail variable: terrorist affiliation and nine offender characteristic variables. The 
results of the cluster analysis support the study’s hypotheses. The four groups of 
offenders that shared case details and offender characteristics were: 1) Internet 
Radicals, 2) Deviant Associates, 3) Trained Jihadists, and 4) Mobile Lone 
Wolves. A second set of clusters, the typology of homegrown terrorists, resulted 
from the case detail variable: event type and eight offender characteristic 
variables. Those groups were Cyber Attackers, Convert Affiliates, and Trained 
Allies. As expected, these groups did not concur with Thachuk et al.’s (2008) 
three categories of homegrown terrorists: legal or illegal, second and third 
generation Muslims, and converts to Islam (p. 2). Instead, the groups discovered 
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in the study were similar and distinct in regards to marital status, foreign travel 
activity, and radicalization factors. These sharing characteristics among the 
groups presented policy implications from effective web-crawling software and 
stringent travel procedures.    
Terrorist Affiliation 
The first cluster of offenders with multiple Internet-based radicalization 
channels resembles Alexander’s (2011) analysis of homegrown jihadist terrorists 
that have been trained online yet with no formal terrorist training. This was also 
the case with this cluster of offenders who were radicalized by jihadist material 
and social networking sites online but yet had no direct communication or formal 
terrorist training. Due to the significant radicalization through extremist material 
and social networking mechanisms available through the Internet, an effective 
web-crawling program that will interdict not only those central nodes of extremist 
material but also the terrorist officials or member nodes that facilitate networking 
among prospective terrorist individuals. As a result, a filtration system such as a 
web-crawler would identify a number of key words to target popular extremist 
websites in order to remove them from the Internet. A successful web-crawling 
system would be key in disrupting the multiplicity of YouTube accounts 
publishing jihadist material as indicated by Klausen et al.’s (2012) study that 
revealed 41 jihadist YouTube accounts to be interconnected.   
Second, the foreign travel activity of homegrown terrorists, both U.S. 
citizens and non-U.S. citizens and their interaction with terrorist officials suggests 
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a more stringent travel policy. A pre-screening and a series of questions should 
be made, similar to when foreign nationals are in the process of being granted a 
visa for temporary visits. Such factors are considered before a foreign national is 
granted permission to visit the United States: the purpose of the trip, the 
individual’s intent to depart the United States after their trip; and/or the 
individual’s ability to pay all costs of the trip. The answers to these questions will 
give insight to the true motives and reasons of why those individuals want to 
travel to those destinations and therefore be able to prevent travel when feasible. 
Moreover, the individuals who are less suspicious to the community and law 
enforcement; those with legitimate jobs blend in with the rest of society and this 
may help them to pursue their terrorist agendas.  
A pre-screening in which the individuals’ Internet activity is monitored to 
see if he or she has had a pattern of accessing jihadist material on the Internet 
would aid detection of at risk individuals. This type of web screening can also be 
done when individuals are being considered for a visa approval from the United 
States. In addition, the United States would work closely not only with equivalent 
Department of State officials in those destination countries but also American 
consulates, if present in those countries. This global effort would effectively 
detect supporters who may be conspiring with others abroad, recruiting abroad, 
and receiving operational support abroad as well. Nonetheless, this type of 
screening and collaboration efforts would prevent radicalized individuals from 
gaining further terrorist influence and support overseas. 
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Since the offenders in the second set of clusters had some college 
education, prevention outreaches at school institutions would also guide the 
student body and faculty in detecting these students. Schools often have some 
kind of restrictions on the content that can be accessed on the Internet while on 
school premises. Internet surveillance is needed to prevent relationships from 
being developed with terrorist officials and recruiters. The school can take further 
action by setting up a system that records pings when a student attempts to 
access extremist propaganda and social networking sites with violent jihad 
content. This record of pings can then be given to law enforcement for 
investigation leads and intelligence. These efforts would entail task force working 
groups between technician support personnel, police, and various faculty 
officials.  
The last cluster of the analysis included a group of offenders who were 
neither radicalized nor traveled abroad. While these offenders lacked the 
operational support abroad and the influencing channels of the other cluster, they 
were able to carry out operations in support of terrorist organizations and plotted 
against the United States. This cluster can be closely aligned to Thachuk et al.’s 
(2008) third category, which consists of converts to Islam. Therefore, this cluster 
needs to be interdicted at a domestic level in which converts unite to worship the 
violent perspective of Islam. This group of offenders held unskilled jobs and 
some, while few, had a presence of negative experiences. Those who had 
negative experiences might have been the reason for turning to Islam in order to 
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find more positive life experiences, as indicated by Agnew’s (1992) general strain 
theory.  
A Typology of Homegrown Terrorists 
The cross-tabulation provided a more in depth description of the three 
groups of offenders based on both terrorist affiliation and event type. The 
comparison signaled three main groups of offenders who should be the primary 
targets for interdiction and prevention of future terrorist activity. Those three 
groups of offenders were Cyber Attackers, Convert Affiliates, and Trained Allies. 
First, the comparison signaled a group that was exactly the same in both models: 
Cyber Attackers. This suggests there is, in fact, a unique group of offenders that 
are successful at providing material support to terrorism without direct affiliation 
from a terrorist organization. This research indicates that policy should be 
targeting these individuals through both a domestic and international approach, 
mainly through a monitoring and web-crawling policy since offenders are gaining 
Internet-based support, some of which derives from videos and other 
propaganda created by terrorist organizations.      
The second group on the other hand, Convert Affiliates, is a group with 
mixed characteristics such as some college education, lack of web-based 
radicalization, no overseas travel, and conversion to Islam. These supporters 
pose a major threat to the homeland due to their close ties to terrorist 
organizations. Since these offenders do not conduct any international travel and 
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are not active on the Internet, their religious ties and college peers need to be 
examined. Specifically, these offenders primarily funded terrorist organizations. 
The third group of offenders, which were both plotters and attackers who 
pose yet a different threat that, may be more difficult to prevent and detect than 
the others. These individuals were more highly educated, held U.S. citizenship, 
and traveled overseas for foreign training. Due to the lack of foreign nationality 
and radicalization, surveillance is difficult. Therefore, more stringent interdiction 
and surveillance of individual’s monetary activity is needed. In depth investigation 
is needed when large amounts of money are being deposited, withdrawn, or 
transferred within accounts.  
Law enforcement should not limit themselves on the array of civil and 
criminal penalties when individuals violate existing financial rules and regulations. 
Suspicious activity reports at financial institutions are already generated but not 
sufficient. Further, increased taxation on some of the materials, such as pre-
cursor chemicals bought by supporters and plotters may make it less likely for 
offenders to illicit funds and property since it will be at a higher cost. Lastly, task 
force officers can work in conjunction with the chemical industry, including 
manufactures and distributors, to detect offenders who attempt to purchase such 
materials for terrorist activity. 
Future research would ideally examine groups of terrorist individuals 
based on the shared characteristics found in the clusters. As already discussed, 
additional research is needed to examine the vast amounts of available extremist 
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propaganda on the Internet and the number of individuals accessing that material 
on a day to day basis. In addition, travel patterns of terrorist offenders would be 
examined to infiltrate terrorist organizations present in those countries of interest.   
 
Limitations of the Study 
There were several limitations in this study. First, there were significant 
variations in the availability, accuracy, and depth of information from case to 
case. The availability and quality of information often depended on such factors 
as the scope and level of advancement of the plot and whether the plot was 
actually executed. For instance, an advanced plot or a completed attack 
generally resulted in a greater dissemination of information owing to the 
expanded focus by prosecutors and the news media. These cases often become 
high profile cases. High profile cases that were prosecuted through lengthy trials 
were more popular among different media outlets allowing the researcher access 
to more disseminated information. 
Trials are not only lengthy, but often result in more information disclosed 
and publicity in the media than those in which pleas are entered. Those cases in 
which the offender underwent a trial produced more information about the 
offense and the defendant’s background, radicalization, and operative modes 
versus those who plead guilty to the charges. Those cases that did not result in 
trials due to plea agreements, such as offenses of material support to terrorism 
yielded less information than the aforementioned. Moreover, because of national 
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security issues, prosecutors may intentionally dispose of cases by plea bargains 
to limit media access or information dissemination. This may limit the external 
generalization of the study findings.  
The typology generated is more apt to apply to individuals involved in high 
profile cases that are involved in more advanced plots or are successful in 
executing their attacks. However, since the study also tracked unsuccessful plots 
and instances of material support to terrorism, a greater variation in offender 
characteristics was found than what prior research has found. It is important to 
note that the defendants’ capability, risks, and operational expertise varied 
significantly. Thus, the variation in offender characteristics revealed during this 
study provides a wider insight to the type of offenders involved in homegrown 
terrorism.  
 Another limitation of the study was the availability of information for 
specific details of the offenders’ background, specifically marital status, number 
of children, mental condition, former military experience, and conversion to Islam. 
Information for these variables were found to only be available when the offender 
did, in fact, have a spouse, children, a mental condition, former military 
experience, and was a convert to Islam. It was found that the varying news 
outlets specifically stated the presence of these variables only when it was 
known about the offender. On the contrary, if the offender was not married, did 
not have children, etc., it was not clearly stated in the news reports.  
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Similarly, the same problem arose with the means of radicalization and 
strain variables. This information was again only clearly stated when the 
defendant was, in fact, radicalized or experienced some type of strain in his or 
her life. Instances in which the offender did not become radicalized or 
experienced strain, was not noted in the court documents and news articles. The 
researcher had to assume an absence of radicalization and strain when it was 
not noted in the sources being used. While this information was found to be 
inconsistent among the participants of the study, the cluster analysis indicated 
significant findings involving these characteristics that are useful for future 
studies.  
Another variable that was problematic was reported mental illness of 
offender. For example, information about an offender’s mental condition is less 
available than simple demographic details such as age and ethnicity affiliation. 
The mental illness variable was also difficult to analyze because it is likely that 
many defendants with mental conditions failed to seek or receive mental health 
care. Second, some mental conditions may not meet the legal criteria, and thus 
may not be fully examined in a trial or plea agreement. Insanity is a legal 
designation, not a psychiatric one. As a result, there may be a greater number of 
people who experience psychiatric distress without that information being 
uncovered at trial. Moreover, the offenders’ mental illnesses may not be revealed 
until they are undergoing criminal proceedings, therefore the information may be 
present but unavailable. 
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While it was the case that some of the offenders’ mental illnesses were 
uncovered until their arrest and during their criminal proceedings, there were, in 
fact, cases in which mental illness was present. While the data set may not be 
complete for all the cases, specifically reported mental illness, the variables 
examined presented significant correlations with other offender characteristics. 
Although limitations were uncovered during the course of this study, the 
findings contribute to the growing research efforts on homegrown terrorism and 
the individuals involved in terrorist operations. Moreover, this study presented a 
working typology of homegrown terrorists that can be used in future research. 
The typology offers a basis in classifying homegrown terrorists within the United 
States and policy for prevention and detection of homegrown terrorism.  
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APPENDIX A 
TERROR PLOTS INCREASING 
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Figure 1. Terror Plots Increasing 
  
Figure 1. The Number of terrorist plots and attacks, by year, from 2001 to 2013.  
Zuckerman, J., Bucci, S. P., & Carafano, J. J. (2013). 60 terrorist plots since  
9/11: Continued lessons in domestic counterterrorism. Retrieved from  
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/07/60-terrorist-plots-since- 
911-continued-lessons-in-domestic-counterterrorism  
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APPENDIX B 
LIST OF VARIABLES  
104
  
 Case Details 
  
 
Offense Type Type of case committed by offender(s), coded: 1= 
Material Support to Terrorism/Conspiracy to Provide 
Material Support to Terrorism, 2=Plot to Attack, 3 = 
Attempted Attack, 4 = Successful Attack. 
Terrorist organization 
affiliation 
Specific terrorist organization affiliated with offense, 
coded: 1 = Al Qaeda, 2 = Other, 3 = None. 
 Number of offenders 
involved 
Number of offenders involved in the offense, coded 
as a count variable. 
 Number of co-
conspirators involved 
Number of co-conspirators involved in the offense, 
coded as a count variable. 
 Number of co-
conspirators who are 
non-U.S. persons  
Number of co-conspirators involved in the offense, 
who do not hold any American citizenship, coded as 
a count variable. 
 Offender Characteristics 
 
  
Demographics  
 
 
Age at time of arrest Age of the offender, coded by years old.  
Gender/Sex  Dummy variable coded 1 if male, 0 if female. 
Citizenship Status  A scale based on degree of legal American 
citizenship status, coded: 1 = U.S. Citizen (U.S. 
born), 2 = Naturalized U.S. citizen (non-U.S. born), 3 
= Legal Permanent Resident (LPR), 4 = Visa holder 
(ex: student visa), 5 = Undocumented (illegally 
residing in the country). 
Immigrant generation  Offender’s generation level of immigrating to the 
United States, coded: 1 = 3rd generation, 2 = 2nd 
generation, 3 = 1st generation. 
Ethnicity affiliation String variable, recoding the ethnic affiliation as a 
social/cultural group or nation of origin. 
Education (highest 
achieved) 
Offender’s highest achieved education, coded: 1 = 
less than high school, 2 = completed high school, 3 = 
technical school, non-college, 4 = some college, 5 = 
completed college (BA/BS), 6 = some graduate 
school, 7 = completed graduate school (M.A.), 8 = 
some/completed Doctorate (Ph.D.) 
Occupation (most 
recent) 
Offender’s most recent occupational status, coded: 1 
= Professional (physicians, architect, teachers), 2 = 
Semi-Skilled (police, military, mechanics, small 
business owners, and students), 3 = Unskilled/None 
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Reported Marital status 
at the time of the 
offense/arrest 
Dummy variable coded 1 if married/common law, 0 if 
single, unmarried, separated/divorced.  
Reportedly have 
children 
Dummy variable coded 1 if offender has one or more 
children, 0 if no children. 
 
Social  
 
 
Reported religious 
affiliation 
String variable  
Reported former military 
involvement/training 
Dummy variable coded 1 if yes, 0 if no. 
Reported mental 
condition  
A scale computed by summing offender’s reported 
suffering from diagnosed/suspected mental condition, 
coded 1 = mental condition, 0 = no mental condition.  
1) mental health issues, mentally troubled, mentally 
ill, 2) schizophrenia, 3) hallucinations, 4) bipolar 
disorder, 5) depression, 6) anxiety, 7) Post-Traumatic 
Stress Disorder (PTSD) 
Reported 
radicalization/influence 
to terrorism via the 
Internet 
   
Dummy variable coded 1 if yes, 0 if no. 
  
Reported 
radicalization/influence 
to terrorism via social 
networking sites (ex: 
Facebook, Twitter, 
YouTube, etc.)   
Dummy variable coded 1 if yes, 0 if no. 
  
Reported 
radicalization/influence 
to terrorism via 
extremist propaganda 
(online, print) (ex: 
Inspire magazine, 
RevolutionMuslim.com) 
Dummy variable coded 1 if yes, 0 if no. 
 
 
Reported 
radicalization/influence 
to terrorism via email or 
direct contact with 
terrorist officials 
 
Dummy variable coded 1 if yes, 0 if no. 
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Reported 
radicalization/influence 
to terrorism via overseas 
training with terrorist 
organizations 
Dummy variable coded 1 if yes, 0 if no. 
 
 
Strain variables 
 
 
Failure to achieve 
positive valued goals:  
   
A scale computed by summing offender’s failure to 
achieve the following positive valued goals, coded: 1 
= event occurred, 0 = event did not occur.  
1) acquisition of wealth, 2) status and respect, 3) 
autonomy 
 
Loss of positive valued 
stimuli (i.e. positive 
experiences or 
acquisitions): 
 
A scale computed by summing offender’s loss of the 
following positive valued stimuli, coded 1 = event 
occurred, 0 = event did not occur.  
1) death of friend/romantic partner, 2) divorce, 3) 
separation, 4) theft of a valued object, 5) loss of a 
good job, 6) loss of the use of a car for a period of 
time  
The presentation of 
negative stimuli (i.e. 
negative experiences or 
loss): 
 
A scale computed by summing offender’s 
presentation of the following negative stimuli, coded 1 
= event occurred, 0 = event did not occur.  
1) abusive parent, 2) boss who puts undue strain on 
individual, 3) parental unemployment, 4) deaths in the 
family, 5) illness in the family, 6) homelessness, 7) 
economic hardship/poverty  
 
Behavioral 
 
 
Reported Criminal 
record  
Dummy variable coded 1 if yes, 0 if no. 
Offender type Method in which terrorist offense was committed, 
coded: 1 if acted alone, 2 if acted in a group. 
Role of offender within 
group 
Dummy variable coded 1 if leader, 2 if non-leader 
(group member). 
Reported Imam leader Dummy variable coded 1 if yes, 0 if no. 
Reported international 
travel 
Dummy variable coded 1 if yes, 0 if no. 
 
Instrumentality  Instrumentality involved in offense, coded: 1 = 
weapons (ex: handguns, WMD), 2 = general 
supplies, 3 = explosives, 4 = safe houses and support 
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(ex: target lists, passports, driver’s license, 
surveillance, etc.), 5 = funding, 6 = jihad training, 7 = 
multiple instrumentalities  
Convert to Islam/Muslim Dummy variable coded 1 if yes, 0 if no. 
Prior Religion   
 
Religion prior to converting to Islam/Muslim, coded as 
a string variable. 
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